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MASS TORTS: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FRANCE AND
THE UNITED STATES—THE VIOXX AND MEDIATOR
CASES COMPARED
Fred Einbinder†
Abstract: Dispute resolution in legal systems has largely been designed for
handling issues between small groups of individuals or organizations. Obtaining legal
redress for those injured by mass torts and using the law as a means to prevent future
occurrences has presented challenges for the development of effective dispute resolution
mechanisms to obtain relief for plaintiffs and deter future tortfeasors. A comparison of
French and American mass tort law and practice offers a fertile field for useful
comparative study given the significant differences in approach taken by each country’s
legal system. These differences derive as much from history, politics, the attitudes and
practice of legal professionals, and business culture as from substantive law. This article
describes and analyzes how these procedural and cultural differences impact French and
American mass tort dispute resolution and how those differences must be carefully
considered in any future attempt to integrate parts of one country’s dispute resolution
mechanisms into the other. Using the French Mediator and United States’ Vioxx drug
scandals and infrastructure disasters as case studies, this article examines and compares
debates over class actions, American “entrepreneurial” lawyers versus French
“corporationist” lawyers, the role of administrative agencies, notions of acceptable risk
and individual responsibility, and the appropriateness of criminal law in mass tort dispute
resolution. This Article concludes with an analysis of whether elements of each system
might be adapted or serve to inspire the other legal system’s improvement.
Cite as: Fred Einbinder, Mass Torts: Dispute Resolution in France and the United
States—The Vioxx and Mediator Cases Compared, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 575 (2020).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal systems developed dispute resolution mechanisms to mediate
issues between small groups of individuals or organizations. Attempts to
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apply traditional law solutions to obtain effective relief for plaintiffs and
deter future tortfeasors in mass tort cases has therefore been challenging.
The significant differences between French and American mass tort
law and practice offer a fertile field for useful comparative study. The
different approaches to the inherent challenges in resolving mass tort
disputes are informed by the history, legal culture, procedural law, political
and economic ideology, and structure and animating forces of the respective
legal professions.
This Article will describe and analyze how these procedural and
cultural differences impact present French and American mass tort dispute
resolution. These cultural differences must be carefully considered in any
future attempt to integrate parts of one country’s dispute resolution
mechanisms into the other.
Using the game-changing French “Mediator” and United States’
“Vioxx” drug mass tort scandals as case studies, this Article will examine
essential differences between French and U.S. approaches to the aggregation
and representation of mass tort litigants. These include differing conceptions
of the role of the State and attitudes toward regulation, notions of acceptable
risk and individual responsibility, the influence of American
“entrepreneurial” lawyers versus French “corporationist” lawyers, and the
appropriateness of criminal law in dispute resolution of mass torts. The
Article will conclude by offering reflections, based on the Mediator and
Vioxx case studies, on how French and American mass tort dispute
resolution mechanisms might be modified to inspire confidence in the ability
of democratic institutions to respond to individual and societal aspirations
for compensatory, corrective, and social justice.
II.

ORIGINS AND ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN
MASS TORT DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A.

French Law and Practice

The history of a country’s legal system influences its civil procedure.
A basic familiarity with that history is therefore essential to inform
comparative analysis and evaluate how suggested modifications in a
country’s dispute resolution system will be received.
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Consequently, this section provides an overview of the development
of French mass tort litigation. Our focus will be those aspects of French
political and legal culture that delayed the adaption of a specific French
mass tort litigation framework and that continue to strongly resist
incorporation of American entrepreneurial lawyer-led mass tort dispute
resolution mechanisms. An examination of an early French mass tort case,
the Mont-Blanc tunnel case, and French asbestos cases will permit
comparison with similar U.S. cases discussed in Section II. B.
1.

The Slow Development of Mass Tort Litigation Mechanisms

a.

History

Group litigation may well have existed in limited cases in early
French law, as it did in medieval English common law. The English system
historically allowed individuals and entities, including sovereigns, to bring
actions to redress group wrongs. Group litigation was also used as a
governance tool, as it was far easier for monarchs to execute legal judgments
against a community than to attempt to enforce numerous individual
judgments.1
Until very recently, however, contemporary French law did not allow
potential litigants to combine their efforts into a mass tort case. Even today,
the mass tort framework is highly fragmented with large gaps in coverage.2

1

Noah Smith-Drelich, Curing the Mass Tort Settlement Malaise, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 8–9
(2014); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 82–86
(1987).
2
Group litigation procedures (action de groups), often translated into English as “class actions”—
with attendant confusion for U.S. legal professionals—were recently introduced in France covering specific
fields of law, beginning with consumer protection in 2014. See, e.g., Loi 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014
relative à la consummation [Law 2014-344 of March 17, 2014 on Consumer Protection], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 18, 2014, p. 1
[hereinafter Loi Hamon]. This law, named, consistent with French practice, after the Minister who
introduced it, provides (by U.S. standards) very limited class-action-type remedies to consumers, who must
be represented by government-approved associations. The scope of covered class actions under this law
was broadened to include discrimination, environmental damage, and breaches of personal data privacy.
See Loi 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle [Law 2016-1547 of
November 18, 2016 on Modernization of Justice in the 21st Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 19, 2016, p. 1.
A mass tort group action in pharmaceutical cases, particularly relevant to the focus of this Article,
was commenced in 2016 and its holding was integrated into the Public Health Code. See Loi 2016-41 du 26
janvier 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé [Law 2016-41 of January 26, 2016 on
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France’s failure to develop mass tort dispute resolution mechanisms
since the Industrial revolution is typical of civil law countries.3 Even in the
United States, the aggregation of claims in mass tort disputes—and the
ability to sue the U.S. government—is of relatively recent origin, dating
back to the trial following the Texas City Disaster of April 1947.4
Despite major technological changes leading to substantially more
harmful industrial disasters, neither the French nor the American legal
systems adjusted their legal practices to enable multiple claimants to succeed
in litigation in mass disaster cases. 5 As mass tort scholar John Fleming
pointed out, doing so in the U.S. legal system required major changes in
society’s conception of private and public accountability.6

Modernization of the Health System], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 27, 2016, p. 1; see also ANTOINE BÉGUIN & JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BRISARD,
EFFETS SECONDAIRES LE SCANDAL FRANÇAIS 262–81 (2016) [hereinafter EFFETS SECONDAIRES]; Action de
Groupe “Santé”: Une nouvelle arme pour le consommateur, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA CONSOMMATION
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.inc-conso.fr/content/action-de-groupe-sante-une-nouvelle-arme-pour-leconsommateur (last visited May 16, 2020); Esther Vogel, Alain Gorny, & Faraj Abdelnour, Action de
groupe: et si les victimes de PIP et Mediator avaient pu y recourir ?, 3 SEA AVOCATS 8, 9 (2016),
https://www.sea-avocats.fr/medias/org-70/shared/article-devicemed-action-de-groupe-pip-mediator--maijuin2016.pdf.
3
See Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 405, 406 (2001).
4
The Texas City Disaster is one of the worst industrial disasters to occur in U.S. history. Although
plaintiffs were successful in obtaining relief from multiple defendants and the federal government—which
had waived its absolute immunity to suit under the recently enacted Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946—the
decision was overturned on appeal. Claimants were finally compensated out of a fund created by a specific
act of Congress in 1955, illustrating the principle that, until the mid-twentieth century, serious obstacles to
redress in mass tort cases were not exclusive to civil law countries. For an excellent narrative of the disaster
and the legal battle that followed, see generally BILL MINUTAGLIO, CITY ON FIRE: THE EXPLOSION THAT
DEVASTED A TEXAS TOWN AND IGNITED A HISTORIC LEGAL BATTLE (2014).
5
The late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century provide several examples of
horrendous man-made mass disasters where appearance of gross negligence did not lead to liability. The
denial of compensatory, corrective, and social justice in the legal proceedings following the infamous
Eastland boat sinking and the Iroquois Theatre and Triangle fires abundantly illustrate these tragedies. For
fascinating narratives of these disasters and the trials, see generally JAY BONANSINGA, THE SINKING OF THE
EASTLAND: AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN TRAGEDY (2004); ANTHONY P. HATCH, TINDER BOX, THE IROQUOIS
THEATRE DISASTER (2003); DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2003).
See STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 119–44 (1980) (summarizing the history of the American tort lawyer
from colonial times to 1950, with special reference to these cases).
6
John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 507 (1994).
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Reasons Why France Rejected Mass Tort Litigation

Nevertheless, in bits and spurts during the post-war period, mass tort
dispute resolution eventually found a home within the American legal
system. 7 The French legal system, however, was unable to successfully
adopt similar mechanisms or find a place to “house” them until very
recently. This failure that may be explained by the following:
First, the initial reflex of a French citizen faced with a mass disaster is
to look to the State. French citizens, more than any developed country, rely
on the State for support in all aspects of their life. When seeking
compensatory, corrective, and social justice, as is particularly the case in
mass disasters, this reliance is especially strong.8
In France, most healthcare expenses are borne by the social security
health system. This is so even for the type of long-term care associated with
mass torts (e.g., asbestos-related illness or illness resulting from side effects
of pharmaceuticals). The system’s generosity is ensured by high mandatory
contributions paid by French workers, who naturally expect ample coverage
in return.9 French victims, while motivated to seek compensation for injury
or the death of loved ones, seldom find themselves in the dire financial
straits that befall many American mass tort victims because of the far less
comprehensive and less generous U.S. healthcare system.10

7

See generally Davis Marcus, The Short Life and Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (2017); Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Torts—Maturation of Law and Practice, 37 PACE L.
REV. 617 (2017) (dating the beginning of mass tort litigation to the start of the MER/29 litigation). As
mentioned in note 4, Texas City may have occurred first, but MER/29 was the first mass tort drug case and
the subject matter of this Article’s Vioxx case study. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mass
Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1990) (using asbestos litigation as a case study in analyzing how
mass tort litigation “matures”).
8
See BERTRAND BADIE & PIERRE BIRNBAUM, SOCIOLOGIE D’ETAT 171–88, 203–10 (1979)
(comparing France to the United States); SANCHE DE GRAMONT, THE FRENCH: PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 196
(1969); VALERY GISCARD D’ESTAING, LES FRANÇAIS: RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE DESTIN D'UN PEUPLE 123–26
(2000). In this Article, compensatory, corrective, and social justice shall mean, respectively, individual,
preventive, and democratically idealized.
9
As of January 2020, employees’ contributions to a broad range of social insurance programs
exceed 25% of their salaries, while employer contributions exceed 50%. The French Social Security
System:
Social
Security
and
Unemployment
Contribution
Rates,
CLEISS,
https://www.cleiss.fr/docs/regimes/regime_france/an_a2.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2020).
10
Paul V. Dutton, Health Care in France and in the United States: Learning from Each Other, THE
BROOKINGS INST. (July 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/dutton.pdf;
Charlotte Morabito, France’s Health Care System Was Rated as the World’s Best—Here’s How It
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After a mass tort injury, the initial French reflex is to seek a
compensation fund, which is created either with the assistance of the state or
a private company. State assistance in creating a compensation fund is
consistent with the primacy and availability of political action in France over
legal remedies. This is in contrast with the United States, where legal action
has long been preferred.11
Second, there is a sharp distinction in the French legal system, and
other civil law systems derived from Roman law, between private law
(individual tort, contract, property, etc.) and public law (institutional
governmental issues, the rights and obligations of citizens vis-à-vis the State
and administrative law (droit administif), etc.). This distinction reinforces
the strong individualistic character of French private law, especially its tort
law. As a result, the attention of private law French legal professionals––
whether judges, lawyers or professors—traditionally focused on individual
disputes. Issues concerning groups, including the establishment of funds,
capped recoveries, and specific legislation, were resolved by administrative

Compares with the US', CNBC (May 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/france-versus-theunited-states-how-the-two-nations-health-care-systems-compare.html.
11
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252–58 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans., 2000) (1848); JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND
FUTURE 1–2 (2015); ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMÉRIQUE ET EN FRANCE:
CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANCA
̧ ISE ET COMMON LAW 84 (2003) (citing de Tocqueville’s view that American
lawyers constituted an aristocracy who channeled sharp conflicts within American democracy into legal
disputes). See generally LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, LE DROIT SANS L’ETAT: SUR LA DÉMOCRATIE EN
FRANCE ET EN AMÉRIQUE (photo. reprint 2016) (1985). Stanley Hoffman, the deceased distinguished
Harvard professor of European (and particularly French) politics in the preface qualified the book as the
most Tocquevillian work written since De Tocqueville and therefore the best. See id. at vii (“le plus
Tocquevillien des ouvrages sur les Etats-Unis écrit depuis Tocqueville, et, pour cette raison, le meilleur”).
In LE DROIT SANS L’ETAT, Cohen-Tanugi, a member of the New York and Paris bars and distinguished
essayist, contrasted France, a country structured and constrained by excesive legislation, regulation, and
bureaucracy, with an America fashioned by contract, lawyers, and civil society. For commentary, see Anne
Deysin, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Le Droit sans l’Etat: Sur la Democratie en France et en Amerique, 1985,
26 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ETUDES AMÉRICAINES 471–72 (1985); Emmanuel Decaux, Cohen-Tanugi, Le
Droit Sans L’Etat, 50 POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE 804–05 (1985) (questioning Cohen-Tanugi’s characterization
of the public service role of French administrative law and the coherence of an often “legal imperialist”
America); Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Le droit sans les États?, 47 ACH. PHIL. DROIT 285–89 (2003) (updating
the analysis in LE DROIT SANS L’ETAT to take account of the need to reinforce state power to deal with the
challenges posed by globalization). See also Brian Danoff, Lincoln and Tocqueville on Democratic
Leadership and Self-Interest Properly Understood, 67 REV. POL. 687, 714–15 (2005); Christine Dunn
Henderson, "Plus ça change...": Innovation and the Spirit of Enterprise in America, 67 REV. POL. 753
(2005).
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regulation.12 Therefore, French criminal courts evolved as the primary venue
for responding to corrective and social justice demands arising out of mass
disasters. Additionally, French civil law prohibits punitive damages, which
prevents recovery above compensatory damages.13
Third, until recently, competent French lawyers were not often
motivated to take on the demanding task of pursuing group mass tort
litigation. The French legal profession may best be classified as
“corporationist,”14 or guild-like, as opposed to the uniquely entrepreneurial

12

See EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 249–303 (2010); John S. Bell,
Comparative Administrative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1261, 1262–64
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). The French State was the engine for change and
the protector of the rights of individuals; tort law was generally not used to seek redress for major injuries.
See COFFEE, supra note 11, at 12 (the “masses might revolt, but they did not sue.”).
13
See Matthew Parker, Changing Tides: The Introduction of Punitive Damages into the French
Legal System, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 402–05 (2013) (comparing French and U.S. law on punitive
damages and emphasizing the strong commitment to corrective justice in French legal culture); see also
Pascale Robert-Diard, Procès du Mediator: “C’est un poison ce médicament qu’on m’a donné!”, LE
MONDE (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/11/22/proces-du-mediator-c-est-unpoison-ce-medicament-qu-on-m-a-donne_6020071_3224.html (quoting Mediator victims preference for
criminal court proceedings in their quest for justice).
14
The term “corporationist” as used in this Article to describe the French legal profession
emphasizes the features that distinguish it from the U.S. “entrepreneurial” legal profession. These features
include the fragmentation of legal professionals into several categories, prohibitions on legal professionals
from engaging in “commercial” activities, and the close attachment and acceptance of regulation by
category members. This “corporationist” model is perhaps best illustrated by the use of a religiously
derived term Ordre—meaning “order” in English—to designate each category. The word
“corporationalist” is often pejoratively used in France to refer to the defense by an organization, or
“corporation,” of its members’ special privileges. See FRANÇOIS DE CLOSETS, TOUJOURS PLUS! 11 (1982).
See generally Tang Thi Thanh Tri Le, The French Legal Profession: A Prisoner of its Glorious Past, 15
CORNELL INT’L L. REV. 63 (1982) (discussing the strict rules preventing lawyers (avocats) from engaging
in any activities other than the practice of law—in particular those classified as “commercial”—and the
legal profession’s fragmentation into guild-like monopolies of specific legal activites).
In addition to avocats, the French legal profession includes notaires, huissiers, and juristes
d’entreprise. Notaires are highly educated (law degree required) professionals who hold a centuries old
monopoly on real estate transfers and document authentication. Moreover, they play a vital role in
providing legal services in the fields of property law, wills and estate planning, and family law. The
English translation of notaire into “notary public” is misleading, as most of the work of a French notaire is
performed by lawyers in the United States. See generally Ezra N. Suleiman, Les Notaires, Les Pouvoirs
D’une Corporation, 21 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 413 (1988).
Huissiers (who have no U.S. counterpart and therefore no accurate translation) are legally trained
judicial officers who serve process, seize property for creditors, and play a critical role in evidence
gathering through the use of constats. A constat is a written report, prepared by the huissier at the request
of lawyers or order of judges that state facts pertinent to the legal proceedings. In practice, constats have
great probative value and are rarely refuted. See Robert W. Emerson, The French Constat: Discovering
more Efficient Discovery, 36 BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L. J. 1, 2–8, 13–18 (2018) (recommending the adoption
of the French constat, modified to comport with American practice, as a means of reducing discovery
costs); see also Dayan v. McDonalds Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 984–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (comparative law
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American bar.15 While attached to the broader altruistic traditions of their
“corporation” and, generally, “solidaire” within the profession, French
lawyers, and particularly trial lawyers, have historically been intensely
individualistic in structuring their offices. This practice inhibits the

analysis of the huissier’s role and the constat mechanism undertaken by Justice Buckley in a case where the
facts placed in evidence through French constats were determinative).
Unlike notaires or huissiers, the term juristes d’entreprises may be accurately translated into
English. The role played by French juristes d’entreprises within companies and their level of legal
education is very similar to that of American in-house counsel. Some U.S. courts have explicitly accepted
this “functional equivalence” between juristes d’entreprise and in-house counsel. See, e.g., Renfield Corp.
v. E. Remy Martin & Co. S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del. 1982). The author of this Article can also attest
to this similarity based on his 30-year experience working in France as a juriste d’entreprise. See Fred
Einbinder, Les Juristes D’entreprise en France: Évolution et Dilemnes, INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES SUR
LA
JUSTICE
(Mar.
13,
2013),
http://forumdelajustice.fr/ihej_wp/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/les_juristes_d_entreprise_en_France_evolution_et_dilemmes.pdf.
There
is,
however, one essential difference between French and U.S. in-house counsel: French juristes d’entreprises
are denied membership in the French bar. That prohibition also applies to avocats who are employed as inhouse counsel, which exemplifies the “corporatist” tradition of the French bar. See Nicholas Tollet, Legal
Privilege et Secret Professionnel des Avocats, regards croisés franco-américains, FRANCE-AMÉRIQUES
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://france-ameriques.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Document-Nicolas-Tollet-3.pdf.
As a consequence of the incompatibility between in-house legal work and bar membership, French
law does not recognize attorney-client privilege for French in-house counsel. This non-recognition can
have serious negative consequences for French companies involved in litigation in the United States (and
U.S. companies with French-facing discovery requests regarding activities in France), including in mass
tort cases. Id.; see also Soulez-Larivière Avocats, Legal Privilege and Professional Secrecy in France,
LEXOLOGY (May 8, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=68973961-f810-415c-976322a4b51bb312. While some U.S. courts have recognized the attorney-client privilege in cases involving
French in-house counsel, others have not. See, e.g., Renfield Corp., 98 F.R.D. at 444; cf. Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5316 RMB MHD, 2006 WL 3476735, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2006).
The negative effects on French companies involved in litigation or government regulation in the
United States caused by the non-availability of the attorney-client privilege was addressed in the recent
Gauvin Report to the French Parliament. The report strongly recommended the creation of a sub-profession
of “avocat en entreprise” who would be bound by the ethical rules of the French bar and would therefore
be able to invoke the “secret professionnel” (roughly equivalent to the attorney-client privilege). See Clair
Durso & Alain Damais, Rétablir la Souveraineté de la France et de l’Europe et Protéger nos eEntreprises
des lois et Mesures à Portée Extraterritoriale, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (June 26, 2019) [hereinafter Gauvin
Report] (French parliamentary report making recommendations for re-establishing France’s and Europe’s
sovereignty and protecting French companies from extraterritorial laws and measures). Based on the fate of
previous reports made by distinguished members of the Paris bar, which also recommended integrating inhouse counsel into the bar, it is unlikely that the Gauvin Report will be adopted. The failure to follow the
recommendations of these reports was due to reticence of the French bar, and, in particular, avocats from
outside Paris. See Les Principales Recommendations du Rapport Darrois, MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE 24–26,
30–33 (Apr. 8, 2009), www.justice.gouv.fr./art.pix/rap_com.darrois-20090402.pdf. This resistance to
change demonstrates the continued vitality of the “corporatist” nature of French legal professions.
15
See COFFEE, supra note 11, at 11–13 (outlining the development of the uniquely American
entrepreneurial model); see also Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Legal Professions: From a
Professions-Centered to a State-Centered Approach, 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 415, 434–39 (1986).
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formation of sufficiently large firms and multi-firm coordination efforts to
handle mass tort cases, as is done in America.
Furthermore, legal advertising and solicitation were strictly prohibited
in France until very recently, making it more difficult for mass tort victims to
find a lawyer.16 Although overall legal fees were and remain substantially
lower than in the United States, cost and risk-shifting mechanisms, such as
contingency fee arrangements and third-party financing, remain far more
restricted.17
Fourth, a deep cultural aversion to American-style entrepreneurial
litigation and hostility toward lawyer-driven lawsuits have led the French to
reject proposed legislation to create class actions.18 The rejected legislation

16

Solicitation of potential clients is strictly prohibited by French bar ethical rules. The imagery of
American lawyers’ unethical conduct following the Bhopal mass tort disaster, and reports of other ethical
lapses in BP Horizon and similar cases, have left a negative impression of the practice on French society
and the bar. Pure contingency fee arrangements are forbidden. Success fees are now permitted but must not
exceed an appropriate percentage of the total fee (10–15%). Limited lawyer advertising is now permitted
after centuries of absolute prohibition. See Delphine Iweins, Publicité des avocats, du rêve à la réalité,
GAZETTE DU PALAIS, June 21, 2016, at 8.
17
Contingency fee arrangements have only recently been authorized and are restricted to 10–15% of
the total fee. See JEAN-JACQUES TAISNE, LA DÉONTOLOGIE DE L'AVOCAT 127 (2019); ALEXANNE
BOUVIGNIES, UNIVERSITY OF PARIS II PANTHÉON-ASSAS, LES CLASS ACTIONS: ETUDE DE DROIT COMPARÉ
ENTRE LES DROITS FRANCA
̧ IS ET AMÉRICAIN 116–28 (2011); DANIEL SOULEZ LARIVIÈRE & HUBERT DALLE,
NOTRE JUSTICE 124–25 (2002). Third party litigation funding, while not prohibited, is rare. See
ALEXANDRE BIARD & RAFAEL AMARO, RESOLVING MASS CLAIMS IN FRANCE 8 (2016). See generally
Ombline Ancelin & Marguerite de Causans, Les prémices du Third Party Litigation funding en France - ou
l’introduction progressive du financement de procès par un tiers, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET
AFFAIRES, Nov. 5, 2015.
18
More than sixteen bills proposing the introduction of class actions were introduced in the French
parliament between 2005 and 2014. None passed. BIARD & AMARO, supra note 17, at 5. The Federation of
French Employers (Mouvement des entreprises en France) (“MEDEF”) intelligently manipulated this
strong French cultural aversion of American entrepreneurial lawyers in its successful lobbying efforts
against the passage of American-style class action legislation in France. The MEDEF’s efforts were
spearheaded by its Director of Legal Affairs, Joëlle Simon, who was a constant presence on panels at
conferences, witness at parliamentary hearings, and commentator in reviews on the subject. See Panelists
Joëlle Simon, Enjeux juridiques et économiques pour les entreprises, and Fred Einbinder, Class Actions à
l’Américaine: caracteristiques et dérives, Les recours collectifs: Quels enjeux stratégiques et économiques,
April 28, 2011; Joëlle Simon, L’action de groupe, panacéé ou cheval de Troie, Concurrences, spéc. N 49,
(2008); Joëlle Simon, Nécessité de l’action du groupe/LE point de vue des entreprises, colloque « L’action
de groupe et l’avocat » Conseil national des barreaux, May 28, 2010; Joëlle Simon, Reply to
Questionnaire Regarding the RESOLVING MASS CLAIMS IN FRANCE Report, at 28–35 (on file with author).
In addition, business interests were able to use the hostility to infringements on the freedom of an
individual to participate in and control litigation while lobbying against the opt-out mechanism of U.S.
class actions. The long-established French law principle of “Nul ne plaide par procureur” (no one gives up
their right to justice to a proxy) would, in the view of most French scholars, prohibit “opt in” procedures.
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would have established a framework for limited consumer class actions and
mass tort actions in cases involving pharmaceuticals.19
c.

Initial Mass Tort Cases

The absence of a legislative framework and reticence by both lawyers
and victims caused mass tort litigation in France to develop slowly.
Nevertheless, a few mass tort cases were litigated with some success prior to
the enactment of modern enabling legislation and the litigation of the
Mediator lawsuits.
i)

The Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire Case

The 7.2-mile-long Mont Blanc tunnel, a major Alpine transport link
between France and Italy, opened to road traffic in 1965. It is one of the
longest and deepest highway tunnels in the world. It was built and is
operated by a Franco-Italian public/private joint venture pursuant to an
international agreement between France and Italy.20 On March 24, 1999, a
truck caught fire in the tunnel. 21 Thirty-nine persons (of nine different
nationalities, but mostly French and Italian) died from carbon monoxide and
cyanide poisoning from the smoke.22
In the days following the tragedy, victims’ family members
informally met to discuss how to obtain compensatory and corrective
justice. 23 One month later, this informal group, which had expanded to
include other clusters of victims’ families, met with a well-known attorney
from the area who was a close friend of one of the victims.24 The attorney,

See VÈRONIQUE MAGNIER, 622 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,
REPORT ON FRANCE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS 114, 119–20 (2009); see also Brief for the
Republic of France in Support of Respondents at 26–27, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 723010 (contending that the U.S. “opt-out” class action mechanism
would violate French constitutional principles and public policy).
19
See BIARD & AMARO, supra note 17, at 7.
20
AUTOROUTES ET TUNNEL DU MONT BLANC (ATMB), https://www.atmb.com/ (last visited May 3,
2020); XAVIER CHANTELOT & MARIE BRUNET, PL0: AU NOM DE TOUS LES NÔTRES 88 (2007).
21
See Mark Gardiner, A Deadly Blaze in the Alps Made a Biker a Hero and Tunnels Safer for All,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/mont-blanc-tunnel-fireanniversary-rescue.html.
22
Id.
23
CHANTELOT & BRUNET, supra note 20, at 1.
24
Id.

JUNE 2020

MASS TORTS

585

who had considerable experience handling multi-plaintiff lawsuits, strongly
recommended the establishment of an association that would represent the
victims’ family members. 25 The association (Association des Familles de
Victimes de la Catastrophe du Tunnel de Mont-Blanc) was legally
established soon after.26
The association, an entity with the capacity to sue in its own name on
behalf of its members, included almost all the fire victims’ families. 27 It
played a critical role not only in pursuing legal remedies but also in
communicating with the press, serving as a liaison with government
authorities, the tunnel operator, and other involved companies, and warning
members against the risks of accepting hastily proposed indemnification
settlements. 28 The association provided critical moral support to its
members, creating a sense of solidarity without which the successful pursuit
of legal remedies would not have been possible.29
The press showed great interest in the disaster and its aftermath. Press
coverage went beyond the story of death and destruction at an iconic
infrastructure site to focus on the important role played by the French state
as the tunnel’s major shareholder and regulator. Further, a French prime
minister and presidential hopeful, who had been the longtime president of
the tunnel-operating company, was called as a witness at trial, which
furnished a political dimension that added to the media interest.30
Legal action was limited to criminal process, but the association
representing victim family members played a key role as a civil party (partie
civile).31 The party was joined to the criminal action brought by prosecutors
after an investigation conducted by investigating magistrates.32

25

Id. at 2.
Id.
27
Id. at 218.
28
Id. at 216–17.
29
Id. at 65, 84–87.
30
See id. at 149–54. Eduard Balladur served as President of the Mont Blanc concession company
from 1968–91, Prime Minister of France from March 1993 to May 1995, and was an unsuccessful primary
candidate for President in 1995.
31
See Fred Einbinder, Corruption Abroad: From Conflict to Co-Operation, A Comparison of French
and American Law and Practice, 3 INT’L COMP. POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
32
Id. at 11–14 (draft page numbers) (outlining the powers of investigating magistrates).
Investigating magistrates create a file (dossier) composed of the results of their investigation during the
26
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On January 27, 2005, the three-month criminal trial concluded and
thirteen of the sixteen individual and corporate defendants were convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. 33 The ten individuals were sentenced to prison
terms ranging between six months and two years (all but one, who served six
months prison time, received suspended sentences).34 The three companies
constituting the operator of the tunnel were each fined €150,000.35
Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, the families of the thirty-nine
victims killed in the disaster received a total of €27 million. That settlement
was based on the Italian compensation index for deaths and injuries, which
was at that time far more generous than the French analogue.36 To ensure
safety, major modifications were made to the tunnel and its entrance.37
The Mont Blanc tunnel case illustrates characteristics of French mass
disaster litigation that remain today. First, the establishment of an
association to represent victims is crucial to French mass tort resolution.
French law and social culture welcome associations in dispute resolution;
such organizations are for all practical purposes mandatory in French mass
tort disputes.38 Second, unlike in U.S. practice, a specialized entrepreneurial
mass tort bar does not exist. 39 Third, criminal proceedings are often
preferred by victims.40 Fourth, plaintiffs tend to look to the French state for

“instruction” phase of criminal proceedings. They also have the power to indict (mise en examen)
defendants during this phase. At the end of this phase they either dismiss the case or submit a report
recommending trial to the prosecutor.
33
CHANTELOT & BRUNET, supra note 20, at 204–09.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 209.
36
Id. at 204–11.
37
Shani Wallis, Fire Damage Rebuild of Mont Blanc Road Link, TUNNEL TALK (Jun. 2001),
https://www.tunneltalk.com/Fire-safety-Jun01-Mont-Blanc-highway-fire-reconstruction.php.
38
French law has explicitly recognized the capacity of associations to represent individuals for over
a century. However, the legal framework governing this capacity is not without complication caused by the
enactment of legislation specific to a type of organization (e.g., trade unions) and differences in treatment
depending on the remedies sought (civil, administrative, or criminal). See BIARD & AMARO, supra note 17,
at 11–15.
39
See discussion infra Section II.A.2(c) and note 73 and accompanying text.
40
Victims seemingly prefer criminal trials in French mass tort cases to satisfy their psychological
need for an emotional catharsis from the trauma they’ve suffered. The prominence of a small group of
French criminal lawyers who have the trial skills required for success contributes to the preference for
criminal trials. See discussion infra Section III.B.4(a) and note 174 and accompanying text.
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both compensatory and corrective justice relief. 41 Fifth, prison terms and
corporate fines are modest by U.S. standards. Compensation paid to victims
is also relatively modest, and almost always made by reference to previously
established indices.42

41
See Parker, supra note 13, at 397–98, 414; Decaux, supra note 11, at 805; Adam Nossiter, Risking
Their
Livelihood
to
Breath
Fresher
Air,
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
3,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/world/europe/france-pollution-fos-sur-mer.html.
42
See, e.g., ROBERT BILOTT, EXPOSURE: POISONED WATER, CORPORATE GREED, AND ONE
LAWYER’S TWENTY-YEAR BATTLE AGAINST DUPONT 353–64 (2019) (relating the saga of the Dupont
Teflon PFOA chemical toxic tort litigation, where $1.6 million was awarded in a single bellwhether jury
trial and an overall settlement of $670.7 million was distributed to 3,500 claimants). The lack of any
available sources relating examples of comparable toxic tort litigation in France is itself telling.
Court judgments, even in cases of serious injury or death, rarely reach U.S. levels. See EFFETS
SECONDAIRES, supra note 2 at 219–22, 243 (noting that a €700,000 award for serious birth defects caused
by the drug Distilbène was rare and that discretionary litigation compensation schedules provide for higher
recoveries than ONIAM compensation schedules). A few Mediator victims have received significant
amounts through the use of the ONIAM compensation (indemnisation) procedure after refusing Servier’s
lowball offers of €390, €415, and €562K. See Pascale Robert-Diard, Procès du Mediator: “C’est un poison
ce
médicament
qu’on
m’a
donné!”,
LE
MONDE
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/11/22/proces-du-mediator-c-est-un-poison-ce-medicament-quon-m-a-donne_6020071_3224.html. However, victims who sought relief in civil or administrative courts
were generally awarded very modest sums (e.g., €7, 650) in application of the discretionary court damages
schedules. See Emeline Cazi, Mediator: la responsabilité civile de Servier confirmée en appel, LE MONDE
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/04/15/mediator-la-responsabilite-deservier-confirmee-en-appel_4902789_1653578.html; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Sept. 20, 2017, Bull. Civ. I, No. 16-19643 (Fr.). Nevertheless, an estimated 1,000
Mediator cases are pending in civil or administrative courts. Almost 10,000 ONIAM indemnity requests
have been filed since 2012. At present, Servier claims to have proposed a total of €181.4 million to
indemnify 3,974 victims. See Baudoin Eschapasse, Mediator: comment le groupe Servier s’occupe
(vraiment) des victimes, LE POINT (Jan. 8, 2020), https:// www.lepoint.fr/societe/mediator-comment-legroupe-servier-s’occupe-vraiment-des-victimes.
Prominent scholars have cautioned against concluding that the French legal system will, relative to
the United States, fail to adequately compensate mass tort victims in every case. See Eric A. Feldman,
Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France and the United States, 34 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 651, 654–57, 695–98 (2000). Professor Feldman compares French and U.S. litigation
approaches to the HIV hemophiliac-contaminated blood scandal, noting the failure of the U.S. legal system
to adequately compensate contaminated-blood victims. He questions the generalizations inherent in the
“Iron Triangle” perspective of comparative legal study, see id. at 655, which focuses on legal cultural legal
institutions and bureaucratic culture. Professor Feldman rightly concludes that the blood scandal cases
demonstrate the need to be skeptical in using overly broad socio-legal assumptions to explain the different
ways in which the French and U.S. legal and political systems treat mass tort cases. Nevertheless, his study
highlights several of the distinctive features of the French legal system discussed in this Article, including:
the French tendency to look to the State for protection; how French plaintiffs, when disappointed by State
inaction and after a mass tort becomes a “scandal,” will press for political redress and eventually criminal
prosecution of responsible agencies and individuals; the conflicting judicial decisions in parallel court
systems; and the intolerable delay of the French legal process. Id. at 688–93, 697; see also COHEN-TANUGI,
supra note 11, at 157 (“the French legal tradition is fundamentally hostile to the development of
litigation”); Jonas Knetsch, Mass Accidents: A Challenge for Tort Law, Comparative Analysis of
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Asbestos Cases

The treatment of asbestos dispute resolution in France further
illustrates the distinctive features of French mass tort dispute resolution.
France was slow to react to the asbestos crisis. Media coverage
existed in the mid-1970s of warnings by members of the scientific
community about the dangers of exposure to asbestos—namely pulmonary
cancer. But initial legislation enacted in 1977 regulating asbestos use was
timid compared to other industrialized countries, especially the United States
and the United Kingdom.43 French asbestos companies formed an informal
bi-partite employer-union association, the Committee on Aspestos (“CPA”),
responsible for the prevention and treatment of asbestos-related injury to
employees, which delayed passing stronger legislation and introducing
lawsuits in the courts. 44 Asbestos use was not prohibited until January 1,
1997.45 According to a 2005 report by the French Senate, asbestos use was
responsible for 35,000 deaths from 1965 to 1995 and an estimated 3,000
deaths per year since.46
The first two asbestos lawsuits before the criminal courts were filed in
1996 by the then-recently created National Asbestos Victims Association,
(Association Nationale des Victimes de l’Amiante) (“ANDEVA”). 47
ANDEVA, as a partie civile, launched a small number of additional criminal

Alternative Compensation Schemes in Japanese and French Law, 21 J. JAPANESE L. 205, 210–13 (2016)
(noting an increase in compensation for French mass tort victims since 2000 following plaintiff-favorable
court decisions and the establishment of special compensation funds).
43
GÉRARD DÉRIOT & JEAN-PEIRRE GODEFROY, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA MISSION COMMUNE
D’INFORMATION SUR LE BILAN ET LES CONSÉQUENCES DE LA CONTAMINATION PAR L’AMIANTE [REPORT
MADE ON BEHALF OF THE JOINT FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE BALANCE SHEET AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF ASBESTOS CONTAMINATION], RAPPORT DU SÉNAT NO. 37 at 26–27, 41 (2005) (Fr.), available at
https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-037-1/r05-037-11.pdf.
44
Concepcion Alvarez, Scandale de L’Amiante: Vers un Procès au Pénal, NOVETHIC (Sept. 4,
2019),
https://www.novethic.fr/actualite/environnement/sante-environnementale/isr-rse/scandale-de-lamiante-vers-un-proces-au-penal-147588.html.
45
Décret 96-1133 du 24 décembre 1996 relatif à l'interdiction de l'amiante, pris en application du
code du travail et du code de la consommation [Decree 96-1133, Dec. 24, 1996, relating to the prohibition
of asbestos, taken in application of the labor and consumer codes], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 26, 1996, p. 19126 (explaining that by this date,
U.S. courts were already flooded with asbestos-related class actions and eight other European countries had
already outlawed asbestos use). See DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 84.
46
See id. at 8; Alvarez, supra note 44.
47
DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 102.
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actions over the next few years, all of which were either dismissed outright
or languished in the courts for years until final dismissal.48 The grounds for
dismissal of these cases included the death of the individual defendant,
difficulties proving causation, and the strict interpretation of the three-year
statute of limitations for involuntary manslaughter or injury.49 The first case
recognizing criminal liability was rendered twelve years later.50 The failure
of the courts to impose criminal liability engendered considerable criticism
from the press and political leaders, who urged the Ministry of Justice to act
by launching criminal actions. The Ministry, prosecutors, and investigating
magistrates, relying on the strict interpretation of technical requirements for
conviction by the courts, resisted these calls to action.51 Consequently, few
criminal cases have been introduced and convictions are extremely rare,
despite numerous judgments recognizing wrongdoing by employers or state
bodies in the social security and other civil courts. 52 The controversy
remains vibrant, with renewed efforts by ANDEVA and other victims’
associations, decades after the introduction of the first criminal cases, to
obtain social justice in a mediatized major criminal trial.53
In contrast to their failures in the criminal courts, ANDEVA, unions,
and other associations have succeeded in obtaining compensation for many
victims by lobbying for compensatory legislation. These groups persuaded
the social security administration to acknowledge that asbestos-induced

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
As an example, in June 2017, the prosecutorial office (parquet) of Paris requested the termination
of fourteen “instructions” (ongoing investigations by investigating magistrates). In September 2018, the
dismissal of a decades-long criminal case against a French automobile equipment company, Valeo-Ferodo,
occurred. The lower courts, largely because of the impossibility of proving causation, and higher courts,
because of statutes of limitations, have been dismissive of criminal actions. See Anaïs Brosseau, Procès
pénal de l’amiante, la bataille continue, LA CROIX (Jan. 8, 2019, 6:44 AM), https://www.lacroix.com/France/Justice/Proces-penal-lamiante-bataille-continue-2019-01-08-1200993802.
53
See generally Andeva, FREIX – Retour au Tribunal, LE BLOG DE L’ANDEVA (Jan. 21, 2019, 2:00
PM), http://andeva.over-blog.com/2019/01/freix-retour-au-tribunal.html; Patricia Jolly, Amiante: l’espoir
d’un
procès
pénal
relancé,
LE
MONDE
(Jan.
8,
2019,
12:04
PM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/01/08/amiante-l-espoir-d-un-proces-penal-relance_5406293
_3224.html. AVA is attempting to bring to justice members of the bi-partite CPA despite the dismissal of
charges against eight of the Committee’s members. See Contamination à l’amiante. Une action des
victimes pour obtenir un procès pénal, OUEST-FRANCE (Jan. 8, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://www.ouestfrance.fr/sante/affaires/amiante/contamination-l-amiante-une-action-des-victimes-pour-obtenir-un-procespenal-6162872.
49
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injuries were work-related and therefore eligible for indemnification. 54
Compensation out of a special asbestos fund55 is granted in accordance with
detailed compensation grids and the decisions of the special bi-partite
commission established for asbestos victims. 56 In the event that disputes
cannot be resolved at the agency or commission level (and prior to its
establishment), cases are referred to the social security courts, often by
associations such as ANDEVA or AVA. 57 Unlike the criminal courts, the
social security courts have held in numerous cases that employers were
liable for committing an unexcused fault (faute inexcusable) with respect to
asbestos.58
The administrative courts, including the Conseil d’Etat, the highest
court in the administrative court system,59 have ruled for the plaintiffs and
held the French state liable. The Conseil d’Etat, in three decisions rendered
on March 3, 2004, found the French state liable for its failure to implement
the principles of prevention and precaution (principles de prevention et de
precaution) in its evaluation of the danger of asbestos use. The French State

54

Id.
A special fund for compensatory asbestos victims, the Fonds d’indemnisation des victims de
l’amiante (“FIVA”) was created by Article 53 of the Social Security 2001 Budget Law of December 23,
2000. See DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 61.
56
DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 61.
57
France, like other civil law legal systems (in particular Germany), welcomes specialization, in
contrast to the common law tradition of general jurisdiction courts with non-specialized generalist judges.
Specialized courts within the ordinary court system include, in addition to those for social security, courts
for labor disputes, criminal offenses, and rural leases. Prosecutors and investigating magistrates are
increasingly specialized and include specialists and panels on financial crimes and—pertinent to this
Article’s case study—health and safety. See STEINER, supra note 12, at 49–50.
58
DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 75.
59
France has two separate court systems. First is the ordinary court system, which handles private
civil and commercial matters, criminal law matters (which is odd for common law professionals, and
admittedly semantically archaic), and specialized courts (for labor, social security, etc.). Second is the
administrative court system, which handles inter-governmental cases and claims and disputes between
individuals and the State or state bodies, including certain state-owned or controlled companies. Unlike in
the United States, the ordinary courts lack jurisdiction to enforce their decisions against the State. Both
systems have at their head a supreme court, the Conseil D’Etat for the administrative courts and the Cour
de Cassation for the ordinary courts. A constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel) handles many (but not
all) constitutional questions. There is no equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court. None of these supreme
courts is hierarchically superior to the others. See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER,
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 38–48 (1998).
55
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underestimated the threat to workers’ health and delayed legislation
necessary to alleviate the danger.60
The asbestos cases confirm the distinctive features of mass tort
dispute resolution noted in the Mont Blanc tunnel case above, and in
addition illustrate:
First, the strong penchant of victims and their representative
associations to use political pressure to obtain individual relief through state
funding of compensatory schemes with established indexes to ensure equal
treatment and reduce arbitrariness. Second, a preference for criminal trials to
provide a cathartic public forum for the victims in their quest for corrective
or social justice. This preference persists in the face of long delays and
serious difficulties encountered in bringing criminal cases. Third, the rising
use by associations of prominent, media-savvy criminal defense lawyers.
These elite lawyers should not, however, be considered the same as a
plaintiffs’ mass tort or class action bar as in the United States. Fourth,
conflicts of jurisdiction between courts (civil, criminal, administrative, and
social security) exacerbate unacceptable delays in dispute resolution,
particularly before the criminal courts.
2.

Distinguishing Features of French Mass Tort Dispute Resolution

A comparison of how different legal systems treat the same problem
offers scholars, practitioners, and legislators an opportunity to reflect on the
strengths and weaknesses in their own system with a view towards reform.
This section provides an analysis of the major role played by the State, the
mandatory use of associations, the absence of a strong mass tort bar, and
evidence gathering and litigation mechanisms that underly French mass tort
dispute resolution.
a.

The Role of the State and Attitudes Toward Regulation

The French state plays a greater role in the life of the nation than in
any other industrialized country.61 This central role for the state in a highly

60

DÉRIOT & GODEFROY, supra note 43, at 100; see Maryse Deguergue, Les Avancées de Principe de
Précaution en Droit Administratif, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 621, 634
(2006) (Fr.).
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centralized nation goes far beyond its relatively larger role in the economy
as shareholder, employer, and regulator. The stark contrast with the
American conception of the state’s role in structuring society derives from
fundamental political, ideological, and cultural differences between the two
countries. 62 It is unsurprising that French mass tort victims attempt to
involve the state by applying pressure on political leaders and largely use
state-created, extra-judicial mechanisms to obtain redress.
Unlike their American counterparts, French mass tort victims have
immediate access to comprehensive state healthcare, which eliminates the
need to sue for the costs of care. Political leaders are pressured to ensure
victims compensation payments are made by the state or defendant company
to a specifically established fund. As a rule, such political pressure succeeds
in large part due to the cultural acceptance that the state should implement
society’s desire for solidarity. In contrast, in the United States, state-funded
mass-tort compensation schemes, such as the one established for the victims
of September 11, are outliers.63
The French expect regulatory bodies (and their respective entrusted
government ministers) to protect them. 64 A minister’s political future and
potential personal criminal liability may therefore depend on their response
to regulatory failure. Consequently, successful ministers devote considerable
time and effort to ensure that the causes of the mass tort scandal are
analyzed and that remedial measures are implemented. 65 American

61

See Suleiman, supra note 14, at 35, 333, 336; Nick Vlahos, The Politics of Subnational
Decentralization in France, Brazil, and Italy, 9 J. PUB. DELIBERATION, Oct. 25, 2013, at 8, 15–16; see also
BADIE & BIRNBAUM, supra note 8, at 171–203; DE GRAMONT, supra note 8, at 196; GISCARD D'ESTAING,
supra note 8, at 123–6.
62
STEPHEN W. SAWYER, DEMOS ASSEMBLED 80 (2018). See generally GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS,
supra note 11.
63
See generally KENNETH FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 FUND
AND ITS EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH (2006); see also Alexandra N.
Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” out of Non-Class
Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 344–49 (2011); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?
56–62 (2012).
64
The use of the French word tutelle, roughly translated as “guardian” or “trustee,” to describe the
relationship between a ministry and “its” regulatory or administrative body is telling.
65
As exemplified by the strong and rapid actions taken by Xavier Bertrand, Minister of Health
during the Mediator case, who initiated a law establishing a victim compensation fund and established an
independent college of experts. See BÉGUIN & BRISARD, supra note 2, at 64–67. Minister Bertrand also
pushed for a parliamentary inquiry that led to the excellent IGAS and Assemblée Nationale Social Affairs
reports on the scandal. See generally L’INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES (IGAS), RAPPORT
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ideological and cultural antipathy to state regulation and administrative
agencies does not exist in France, which largely explains the differences in
the two dispute resolution systems.66
b.

The Mandatory Use of Associations

French law does not strictly require the regrouping of plaintiffs into an
association to bring suit in mass tort actions (except for the recent
legislatively created specialized class actions). In practical terms, however,
the procedural and financial obstacles imposed by a legal system established
to treat individualized disputes dictate their involvement.
Moreover, the pursuit of economic, political, regulatory, and judicial
objectives through associations is a fundamental and distinctive
characteristic of French history and culture.67 No mass tort action in France
has succeeded or will succeed in the absence of an association capable of
uniting plaintiffs behind a coherent strategy for obtaining compensatory,
corrective, and social justice.68
The legal framework for class actions, established by the Hamon law
(Loi Hamon) on a limited specialized basis, exemplifies French attitudes
towards the role of associations as applied to mass tort cases. First, only not-

NO. RM2011-001P ENQUÊTE SUR LE MEDIATOR [SURVEY OF MEDIATOR] (2011),
http://www.igas.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RM2011-001P.pdf [hereinafter IGAS REPORT]; ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE,
COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, RAPPORT D'INFORMATION NO. 3552 [INFORMATION REPORT NO.
3552] (2011), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i3552.pdf [hereinafter AFF. SOC.
RAPPORT].
66
As summed up by Peter Schuck, “Americans are profoundly, and perhaps incorrigibly,
antibureaucratic.” Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 979 (1995). American legal scholars have argued that the entire system of U.S. administrative
law is unconstitutional as a result of broad judicial acceptance of “deference” and the system of
administrative judges. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2015).
This argument is incomprehensible to French legal professionals with respect to their own, vastly different
system, which is generally viewed as the most highly developed and influential administrative law system
in the world. French administrative judges have over the centuries attained a high degree of independence
from the executive and do not hesitate to exercise control over regulatory action by invoking concepts
derived from the “legality” principle.
67
For example, anti-corruption actions brought by French NGOs. See Einbinder, supra note 31, at
60–61. See generally GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 11.
68
The use of the word “family” to refer to the relatively successful Mont Blanc Tunnel victim
association is illustrative. The difficulties encountered by victims of the AZT (an explosion of an oil
company’s plant in Toulouse in 2001) largely resulted from the association’s inability to secure the
adhesion of its members to such a strategy. See CHANTELOT & BRUNET, supra note 20, at 216–17.
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for-profit associations previously approved by the state are entitled to
represent plaintiffs.69 Second, only approved associations, not lawyers, may
introduce lawsuits, which demonstrates the deep hostility in France to
entrepreneurial lawyers.70 Third, associations may not bring actions against
the state or its agencies; these may only be brought before the administrative
courts by individual plaintiffs. 71 Fourth, associations are encouraged to
attempt to assist individuals to obtain compensation from publicly or
privately funded institutions and submit disputes to mediation for resolution
to avoid or end litigation.72
c.

The Absence of a Mass Tort or “Class Action” Bar and
Entrepreneurial Lawyers

Despite the strong Parisian presence of large American-based
international law firms and some loosening of the strict restrictions on legal
advertising, the French legal profession (or “corporation”) remains
characterized by fierce individualism and traditionalism in the defense of its
clients and itself. It also remains hostile to American entrepreneurial lawyers
and the encroachments of American law, particularly in procedural
practice.73

69

Fifteen consumer protection associations were approved to file consumer “class actions” under the
Hamon law. See Loi Hamon, supra note 2. Almost 500 associations have been approved for filing health
and safety group actions under the 2016 Health System Modernization Law. See SEA AVOCATS, supra note
2.
70
Associations, not lawyers, are supposed to act in the public interest as a civil society auxiliary to
the state, in its role as caretaker of the public good. The assignment of the defense of community social
interests and democratic ideals to the state and assisting associations, and not to lawyers, contrasts with the
central role that lawyers are urged to play in implementing the idea of communitarianism or public interest
law as advocated, respectively, by Judge Weinstein and Abram Chayes. See generally Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Lawyering in Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2177 (1997) (promoting Judge Weinstein’s
communitarian ethic in mass torts); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (critiquing Abram Chayes call as being outdated).
71
Associations may, however, bring group actions against professionals (e.g., physicians, public
hospitals, etc.).
72
SEA AVOCATS, supra note 2.
73
See Schiller, infra note 101, at 177–90; Jean-François Riffard, Justice: Sommes-Nous tous
Condamnés à Devenir des Lawyers Américains?, THE CONVERSATIon (June 10, 2018, 4:40 PM),
https://theconversation.com/justice-sommes-nous-tous-condamnes-a-devenir-des-lawyers-americains97752. Commentators have noted a direct and close link between increases in mass tort litigation and the
ease of linking lawyers willing to represent victims. In the United States, this linkage was greatly facilitated
by the explosion of lawyer advertising in the early 1980s following Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977). In addition, American attorneys increased their chances of winning mass tort cases by co-
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France lacks a mass tort plaintiffs’ bar specializing in the
identification, development, and resolution of mass tort disputes.
Consequently, the intense internal competition that has shaped U.S. mass tort
dispute resolution does not yet exist.74 While the long Parisian presence and
increasing reach of large American and English law firms may have
influenced French legal practice in certain areas, such as M&A, financing,
and compliance, these have had little influence in the field of mass torts. As
illustrated by recent legislation prohibiting the lawyer-led mass tort legal
actions, French hostility to the emergence of an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’
bar renders any hope of an acceptable return on the large investment for
entrepreneurial law firms, as was required in the development and
maturation of U.S. mass torts dispute resolution, delusory.75
Consistent with the traditions of the French bar, the closest
resemblance to a “mass tort” bar is led by a few nationally known mediasavvy criminal defense lawyers who represent partie civile plaintiffs. Their

operating with other lawyers in sharing resources, information and strategies. See Deborah R. Hensler,
Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1967, 1025–
26 (1991). In France, advertising is recent and remains timid by U.S. standards, and co-operation between
highly individualistic law firms is rare. Finding a lawyer for plaintiffs of a mass tort remains difficult, and,
as illustrated in Mont Blanc Tunnel, often serendipitous. Since the passage of the Hamon and Touraine
laws, discussed infra at Part II.B.5, associations now largely choose lawyers in mass tort cases, limiting the
importance of advertising. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of entrepreneurial lawyering
and its impact on American law. See generally COFFEE, supra note 11; ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2003); Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial
Legalism—A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1994). For a comparative study, see
generally Rueschemeyer, supra note 15.
74
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix (2007).
75
The general lack of interest in handling mass torts is vividly illustrated by the difficulty faced by
Irene Fauchon, the whistleblowing pulmonary physician who broke open the Mediator scandal, in finding
an experienced mass torts lawyer. She eventually found a young attorney, Charles Joseph Oudin, who at the
time had no experience in the field but has since acquired a considerable amount representing an
association of a large group of Mediator victims. See generally LA FILLE DE BREST (Haut et Court 2016)
(the well acted and received film about the Mediator scandal); Etienne Sorin, La Fille de Brest: un médicin
en campagne, LE FIGARO (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.lefigaro.fr/cinema/2016/11/22/0300220161122ARTFIG00232-la-fille-de-brest-une-operation-a-coeur-ouvert.php (favorably reviewing the film
starring Sidse Babett Knudsen); IRENE FRACHON, MEDIATOR 150 MG: COMBIEN DE MORTS? (2010).
Fauchon’s compelling and barely contested testimony was a seminal moment in the ongoing Mediator
criminal
trial.
See
Pascale
RobertDiard, Au procès du Mediator, le combat d’Irène Frachon, LE MONDE (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2019/10/17/au-proces-du-mediator-le-combat-d-irenefrachon-j-ai-eu-le-sentiment-d-etre-traquee-alors-que-je-ne-faisais-que-montravail_6015807_1653578.html.
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main goal is to use the criminal proceedings as a means of exerting political
and societal pressure on state agencies and defendant companies.76
d.

Features of French Procedural Law

Comparative law analyses often focus on the substantive law
differences between national legal systems. This traditional approach 77
would be woefully inadequate in the mass torts context, particularly given
the primacy of the entrepreneurial lawyer-dominated mass tort legal
environment in the United States. An overview of how French and U.S. civil
and criminal procedural law and practice differ is therefore essential to
analyzing the perils inherent in opportunities for Franco-American crossfertilization in the mass tort field. Fundamental differences exist in evidencegathering methods, the types and amounts of recoverable damages, costs of
trial, availability of juries and judicial specialization.
i)

Evidence Gathering––Limited “Discovery,” Witness Testimony, and
Court Mandated Experts

Evidence gathering in France is vastly different from U.S. law and
practice in both civil and criminal cases. Consistent with civil law tradition
and the principle of judicial sovereignty, French judges play the central role
in evidence gathering, be it in the production of documents, party and
witness examination, or the choice and supervision of expert witnesses.78
Discovery is limited in France.79 Parties are not generally required to
disclose particular documents or categories of documents80 and parties need

76

For example, Patrick Maisonneuve and Eric Dupont-Moretti, two of France’s best-known criminal
defense lawyers. In contrast to U.S. practice, mass tort criminal cases, if not dismissed prior to or during the
instruction phase, are not settled by plea bargains and go to trial. Corporate plea bargaining has only
recently been permitted in French criminal law and has been limited to a few recent cases of international
corruption following the enactment of the Sapin II law. Individuals cannot enter a plea bargain in a serious
criminal case. See Einbinder, supra note 31, at 14–21, 58–59.
77
See generally Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1328 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
78
See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1261–62 (2005) (providing an
excellent comparative study of French and U.S. civil procedure in support of her proposal to incorporate
more French-inspired inquisitional court control in complex litigation). See also Einbinder, supra note 31.
79
Whether “discovery” exists at all in France is a subject of controversy, mostly turning on semantic
arguments when the question is asked relative to the extensive discovery practice in the United States.
Some practitioners, however, undoubtably are reacting to many American lawyers’ bewilderment and

JUNE 2020

MASS TORTS

597

not disclose documents favorable to the other party.81 No penalty exists for a
party’s non-disclosure; the remedy for failing to do so is limited to the
adverse inference argument made to the judge by the opposing party. 82
French judges tend to be wary of the oral testimony of witnesses,
preferring written declarations (attestations). Cross examination is extremely
limited, certainly not a skill required to be a successful trial lawyer, as it is
the judge who questions witnesses and who may comment on the answers.83
The absence of civil juries in the civil law tradition, and their relatively
limited use in criminal trials, largely eliminated the need for complex rules
excluding evidence.
French law relies on presumptions, such as the one that the testimony
of an employee is made for the benefit of their company, to facilitate the
evidence gathering process. This contrasts with the need to weigh credibility
after direct and cross examination as required in an American trial.84

expressions of disdain on being refused the broad document production to which they are accustomed,
protest vociferously that French law does permit limited discovery a la française. See Mullenix, supra note
70, at n.22 (quoting internationally experienced practitioners, Elie Kleiman and Daniel Soulez-Lariviere,
stating that discovery, as it is known in the United States, does not exist); see also COFFEE, supra note 11,
at 200; see also Diego Zambeano, A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall and Return of International Comity
in Transnational Discovery, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 157, 167–69 (2016) (noting that it is the judge rather
than the parties who has the primary duty to gather facts). Lawyers for the parties may request a judge for
documents and that judge may at their discretion order the other party to produce evidence. Zambeano
underlines that France has been vociferous in expressing disfavor of U.S. attempts to compel discovery in
cases involving French defendants. Id. at 179. France enacted a “blocking statute” criminalizing the
production of documents to U.S. authorities. Loi 80-538 du juillet 1980 relative à la communication de
documents et renseignements d’ordre économique ou technique à des personnes naturelles ou morales
étrangères [Law 80-538 of July 16, 1980 on the Communication of Economic, Technical or Commercial
Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 17, 1980, at 1799.
80
Gathering Evidence: How Does France Compare?, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS LLP (June 10, 2013),
https://larevue.squirepattonboggs.com/gathering-evidence-how-does-france-compare_a2075.html. For an
account of how procedural and other legal cultural differences concerning evidence gathering impacted an
early, successful U.S. mass tort case against a French defendant—namely, the 1949 crash of an Air France
plane carrying Marcel Cerdan, the French middle-weight boxing world champion, and tens of American
victims, see SPEISER, supra note 5, at 177–81.
81
Gathering Evidence, supra note 80; John Bell, supra note 59, at 93–96.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 98–100.
84
Id. at 99.
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Experts are judge-appointed—usually from a list of approved neutral
experts in the field. 85 Judges, particularly if the case involves highly
technical questions, tend to essentially delegate their decision-making
obligations by following the expert’s report (expertise).86
The possibility for associations of mass tort victims to join, or in some
cases initiate, criminal proceedings as civil parties offers two advantages.
First, it enables the civil party a means to acquire, at no cost, evidence
obtained by an investigating magistrate or prosecutor in the instruction phase
of the criminal trial. Second, criminal trials provide a public forum for the
pursuit of social justice.
The above features ensure that the costs associated with French civil
proceedings are substantially lower than in the United States. 87 The cost
incentive driving settlement of mass tort cases is therefore not as great in
France as it in the United States. However, other incentives and constraints
militate settlement in France, such as the availability of compensation
through state or company funded schemes, limited access to lawyers,
constraints on contingency fees, and court system delay.
ii)

Damages and the Absence of a Jury

The level of damages and fines recovered in mass tort litigation in
France pales in comparison to those awarded in the United States. In the
Mont-Blanc tunnel cases, three corporate entities were fined €150,000 each
for involuntary manslaughter, and €27 million was obtained in a settlement
agreement for the deaths of the thirty-nine victims.88 In Alstom, the company
was fined €75,000 following convictions for imposing a risk and its
attendant anxiety on its employees, and damages of €10,000 were awarded
to each of the 150 plaintiff-employees, €1.5 million in total.89

85

Id. at 100–01; Kessler, supra note 78, at 1265–67.
John Bell, supra note 59, at 101–02; Kessler, supra note 78, at 1267.
87
See FREDERICK T. DAVIS, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 150 (2019). The cost
differentials in both civil and criminal matters are highly significant. See also Kessler, supra note 78, at
1151, 1189 (decrying the systemic wealth based inequities resulting from the misuse of discovery and
expert testimony mechanisms to drive up costs to wear down the adversary).
88
CHANTELOT & BRUNET, supra note 20, at 209–11.
89
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Douai, 6e ch., Mar. 6, 2008, 07/01123.
86
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Fines and damages in mass tort cases are increasing in France, but the
rate of increase is lower than in the United States, and average awards
remain relatively low. The pharmaceutical company Servier, which
developed and sold the drug Mediator, has offered a total of €164.4 million
in settlements to 3,732 patients (an average of approximately €44,000 per
patient).90 Recovery for plaintiffs based on compensation grids and averages
from court cases range from €50,000 to €100,000 for a death, including
“moral damages” for loss of a loved one or serious injury.91
Punitive damages are not recoverable because their deterrence and
punishment goals are implemented by the French state or victims bringing
criminal charges.92 Juries do not exist in civil trials and the charges generally
brought against criminal mass tort defendants are not sufficiently serious to
warrant a jury trial under French law.93 The French criminal trial in heavily
reported cases, such as that presently underway in the Mediator scandal,
plays a similar democracy-affirming, social-justice function as the American
jury trial. A unique criminal proceeding in a dedicated court, Cour de justice
de la République, exists for ministers accused of serious misfeasance in the
conduct of their mission.94

90
Emeline Cazi, Le Scandale du Mediator en Procès, LE MONDE (Sept. 21, 2019, 9:26 AM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/09/21/le-scandale-du-mediator-en-proces_6012535_
3224.html.
91
Marie-Christine Tabet, La Contre-attaque des Laboratoires, JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE (Mar. 27,
2011).
92
See Parker, supra note 13, at 413–17.
93
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 113 (3d ed. 2007) (juries in civil
trials); Pascale Robert-Diard, Réforme de la justice: le lente erosion du rôle des jurés citoyens, LE MONDE
(Mar. 9, 2018, 12 :00 PM), https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2018/03/09/la-lente-erosion-durole-des-jures-citoyens_5268188_1653578.html; Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, Affaires de viol: le jugement hors
des cours d’assises est déjà une réalité, LE MONDE (Mar. 9, 2018, 12 :00 PM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2018/03/09/affaires-de-viols-le-jugement-hors-des-cours-dassises-est-deja-une-realite_5268185_1653578.html.
94
This court was notably used in the trial of several ministers, including the minister of health and a
former prime minister in the infamous scandal of tainted blood in HIV treatments (l’affaire du sang
contaminé), a mass tort precursor to Mediator that also led to parliamentary investigations and reform of
the procedures in the health field. The scandal was not limited to France—it spread to the United States,
where it was the subject of the filing of class action lawsuits against the French manufacturer. See generally
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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France is a unitary state and its law and court system are therefore
devoid of the forum-shopping opportunities that exist in the United States’
federalist structure. Nevertheless, the existence of specialized independent
court systems (ordinary, administrative, and constitutional) has led to
confusion and delay in mass tort cases, notably in Mediator.
Executive and administrative acts are not susceptible to review by the
ordinary courts and can only be contested in the parallel administrative court
system, which has earned its independence from the executive through
institutional tradition. This is an example of the French Revolution’s
hostility to judicial power, which is seen as a means of suppressing the
popular will. Issues of categorization (e.g., is the defendant a government or
private entity?) may lead to significant delay and confusion from conflicting
decisions.95
Confusion and delay may also result from jurisdictional issues
between civil and criminal courts, which are both housed in the ordinary
court system.96 In addition, recent innovations expanding judicial review of
the constitutionality of legislation, and thereby the potential for the
involvement of the parallel constitutional court system, has increased the
potential for complication and delay in mass tort cases.97
Lastly, arguments based on European Union law may also be a source
of conflict and delays in mass tort cases.98 For example, the French legal
cultural preference for promoting specialized expertise within the judicial
system is pertinent to mass tort dispute resolution as evidenced by the

95

Conflicts about categorization between the two systems are ultimately resolved by the Tribunal
des Conflits, a tribunal composed of an equal number of judges from the Cour de Cassation and Conseil
d’Etat. See STEINER, supra note 12, at 98; John Bell, supra note 59, at 86. Tort cases brought against the
French state are governed by tort law fashioned by the administrative courts which may differ from the
civil code-based law applied in the ordinary court system. See Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in France: A
Cultural and Comparative Overview, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 471, 485–86 (1995).
96
See discussion infra Part III.A.4.
97
See MICHEL DE GUILLENCHMIDT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 427–28
(3d ed. 2010).
98
See generally WILLEM H. VAN BOOM & GERHARD WAGNER, MASS TORTS IN EUROPE – CASES
AND REFLECTIONS (European Ctr. of Tort and Ins. Law ed., 2014).
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existence of special social security courts and a prosecutorial office devoted
to health and safety cases.99
B.

U.S. Law and Practice

1.

History and the Role of Entrepreneurial Lawyers in the Development
of Class Actions and Mass Tort Dispute Resolution

a.

Introduction

France and the United States are situated on opposite ends of a
continuum of industrialized countries for the development, intensity, and
maturation of mass tort dispute resolution. The origins of mass tort (and
class action) cases, their dramatic rise in volume and amounts recovered, and
arguable state of maturity, 100 occurred earlier in the United States than in
France.
The rapidity and intensity of change in mass tort dispute resolution in
the United States, combined with attempts by U.S. law firms to impose
aspects of the model abroad, 101 has tended to obscure the fact that
aggregated mass tort litigation in the United States is relatively nascent.
Narratives of victim recovery and the restoration of social justice in print
and film have contributed to a mythification of mass tort development that
ignores the many decades when, despite egregious cases of gross negligence,
criminal and civil resolutions invariably favored defendants. 102 Moreover,
class actions and mass torts were as much subjects of battle in the “tort
wars” of the 1990s as punitive damages and contingency fees. 103

99

The specialized prosecutorial office was created by the Health Santé law. See supra note 2. French
prosecutors (procureur) are referred to and consider themselves to be an integral part of the judiciary—a
source of considerable controversy and judicial rebuke by other European legal institutions, such as the
European Court of Human Rights. See Einbinder, supra note 31, at 5–11.
100
See generally Marcus, The Short Life, supra note 7; Rheingold, supra note 7. As detailed in Part
II.A, it is hardly a foregone conclusion that France will follow American mass tort developments, nor does
it desire to do so.
101
See Sophie Schiller, Hypothèse de l’Américanisation du Droit de la Responsabilité, in V.
MAGNIER, RECEPTION DU DROIT AMERICAIN DANS L’ORGANISATION INTERNE DES SOCIETES
COMMERCIALES 177-190 (2001); see also Jean-François Riffard, supra note 73.
102
For example, the books and star-studded films on toxic contaminants. See, e.g., A CIVIL ACTION
(Touchstone Pictures 1995) (starring John Travolta) and ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000)
(starring Julia Roberts).
103
See Marcus, The Short Life, supra note 7, at 1570–71; JOEL LEVIN, TORT WARS 212–15 (2008).

602

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

b.

VOL. 29 NO. 3

The Central Role of Entrepreneurial Lawyers in Developing Mass
Tort Dispute Resolution

The relative early development and consequent rapid increase in
intensity of American mass tort dispute resolution is the product of several
factors: technological and economic changes, the 1960s tort revolution, the
recognition of strict product liability, the development of new categories of
compensable harms, the growth of punitive damages, increasing healthcare
costs, liberalized bankruptcy law, and the passage of class action
legislation.104
While recognizing the importance of these factors, this Article argues
that the typical path of U.S. mass tort disputes is distinguished from French
efforts by the role of the entrepreneurial lawyer.
The distinctively entrepreneurial nature of the bar in the United States
was apparent even in colonial times. Unlike the highly socially stratified
bifurcated bars of the mother country or the several “corporations”
comprising the legal profession (magistrats, avocats, avocats auprès des
cours suprêmes, avoués, notaires, juristes d’entreprise, conseils juridiques,
huissiers) in France, American lawyers were members of a unified
profession which included members who entered the profession as a means
of improving their social and economic status.105
The extraordinarily prominent role played by lawyers in all facets of
life comports with the unifying and idealized “sacred” role of law in the
United States. America’s archetypal lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, fully
admitted that he entered the legal profession to “better himself” socially and
economically. His view of the law as the secular religion of the country and
acceptance of difficult, but potentially lucrative, cases requiring novel
theories, and approaches to win exemplifies the aspirations of the American
entrepreneurial lawyer.106

104

Schuck, supra note 66, at 947–48.
See SPEISER, supra note 5, at 145–62.
106
See generally ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (H. Jack Lang
ed., 1965) (collecting Lincoln’s quotes). Some of Lincoln’s quotes illustrate distinctive features of the
American legal profession claimed by entrepreneurial lawyers—i.e., social mobility, faith in the law as a
unifying force in society, and the need for lawyers to be “folksy” with juries: “My early life . . . the short
105
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In the years following the end of World War II, modern
entrepreneurial lawyers were able to gradually reverse the highly favorable
legal environment for mass tort defendants, and either win at trial or
negotiate satisfactory damage recoveries for plaintiffs. 107 These
breakthroughs occurred prior to the use of either federal multidistrict
litigation (“MDL”) or use of class actions for aggregating claims, which
commenced in a limited fashion, in the late 1960s. Under the MDL
procedure, common fact mass torts lawsuits may be consolidated in federal
courts to promote efficiency, an objective that has largely been attained since
the introduction of MDLs in 1968.
The use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions in mass
tort cases, however, has not furthered effective disposition of mass tort
cases. Following significant revision to Rule 23 in 1966, Rule 23 has
generated considerable judicial and academic controversy.108
The early successes of the 1950s and early-to-mid 1960s may be
attributed to the development of an embryonic bar of mass tort practitioners:
practitioners who combined their familiarity with specialized technology,

and simple annals of the poor[;]” “[l]et reverence for the laws be . . . preached from the pulpit . . . [and]
become the political religion of the nation[;]” “young lawyer, don’t shoot too high—aim lower and the
common people will understand you.” Id. at chs. 2, 5, 9; see also DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF
RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28–29, 47, 150–51 (2005) (discussing the
camaraderie and folksiness of Lincoln and his legal colleagues and noting how law furnishes an avenue for
social mobility—and quoting de Tocqueville that, “all men want to quit their former social position”).
Lincoln was also fascinated by innovative technology; being the only U.S. president to have filed for and
obtained a patent—for a lift to hoist riverboats over sandbars and shallow waters. Lincoln, on occasion,
attempted to use novel theories in in his legal arguments. He also anticipated modern mass tort practice in
strongly urging settlement in costly and uncertain litigation. See BRIAN R. DIRCK, LINCOLN THE LAWYER
87, 160–61 (2007).
107
See generally SPEISER, supra note 5, at 302–36, 355–66 (detailing the author’s personal
experience handling pre-multi-district products liability litigation in major aviation (Alouette II) and
automobile (Ford Pinto) mass tort cases).
108
MDLs were launched in 1968 pursuant to a law passed by Congress that established the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, responsible for determining whether an MDL is appropriate and selecting
the presiding judge in pretrial proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Rheingold, supra note 7, at 621–22; FED.
R. CIV. P. 23. For a detailed and comprehensive history of the mass tort, class action saga and the problems
encountered by attempted use of the Rule 23 class-action framework, see Marcus, The Short Life, supra
note 7, at 1568–69, 1584, 1589, 1592–97; Schuck, supra note 66, at 945–63; COFFEE, supra note 11, at
108–18.
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particularly in aviation, with entrepreneurial risk-taking in pursuing recovery
for victims of aircraft and automobile crashes and large fires.109
The late 1960s and 1970s saw a confluence of older form mass tort
litigation, such as the Buffalo Creek mining dam litigation, 110 and newer
forms, where attempts (almost all failures) were made to use Rule 23 class
action procedures or MDL (with more success). 111 The mass tort bar

109

SPEISER, supra note 5, at 145–92 (recounting the beginnings of the entrepreneurial lawyer);
Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform,
73 VIRGINIA L. REV. 845, 846 (1987) (discussing the “Abraham, Dilemma” and noting the Ringling Bros.
and Coconut Grove Fires). See generally HENRY S. COHEN & DAVID BOLLIER, THE GREAT HARTFORD
CIRCUS FIRE: CREATIVE SETTLEMENT OF MASS DISASTERS (1991); JOHN C. ESPOSITO, FIRE IN THE GROVE:
THE COCOANUT GROVE TRAGEDY AND ITS AFTERMATH (2005).
110
See generally GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (2d ed. 2008) (narrating the
fascinating story of the mass tort litigation Stern brought on behalf of over 600 plaintiffs, those injured or
the descendants of more than 125 persons killed when a coal waste “dam” collapsed wrecking death and
destruction from the tidal wave that descended on the Buffalo Creek valley in West Virginia in February
1972). Gerald Stern’s book, a staple for outside reading in undergraduate and law school courses for
decades (including the author’s classes), vividly recounts how entrepreneurial mass tort lawyering was
successful in obtaining a large settlement (for the time and place) of $13.5 million against the Pittson
Mining company. Stern’s entrepreneurial lawyering is demonstrated by his financial risk-taking in
preparing the case on a contingent fee basis although––unlike most mass tort entrepreneur-lawyers––he
was a partner in a prestigious, large law firm whose fellow partners expressed serious misgivings as the
expenses and opportunity costs of handling the case climbed. Also consistent with entrepreneurial litigation
were the breaking of new ground in the law (it was the first case in the state accepting claims based on
“psychic impairment”) and artful settlement negotiation just prior to trial with a corporate defendant with a
reputation for scorched earth, delay, and fight-to-the-end tactics. Stern emphasizes that the key to success
was the arduous and emotionally draining task of retaining coherence and a sense of a like-minded
community amongst the many individual plaintiffs.
111
Throughout the 1970s the federal judiciary refused to warm to the notion that Rule 23 class action
certification was appropriate in mass torts cases. Certification was denied or reversed on appeal in all but a
few cases. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 1568–69.
MDL’s fared better. For example, yet another case, with a French connection—the Turkish
Airlines DC 10 that went down over the Ermenenville forest soon after takeoff from Orly airport in Paris
killing 346 passengers and crew—was one of the first major mass tort cases so consolidated. Stuart Speiser,
LAWSUIT author, former pilot, and aviation mass tort lawyer handled this international case (on behalf of
plaintiffs from twenty-four nations) that raised complex questions, including issues of jurisdiction, conflicts
of law, and forum non conviens. The case ended in a settlement of over $62 million, the largest amount yet
paid in an aviation case. See SPEISER, supra note 5 at 420–69. Speiser was the proto-typical entrepreneurial
lawyer for his time, and, consistent with the methods and ethos of the growing mass tort specialist bar, was
unafraid of taking economic risks, tried out novel legal theories, pursued settlement while preparing for a
“folksy” presentation of his case to the jury, and avidly promoted American entrepreneurial litigation
worldwide.
Especially pertinent to this Article’s comparative case studies of pharmaceutical cases, the MER29 cholesterol reducing drug case is considered a watershed mass tort case, as it saw for the first time the
voluntary grouping and wide-ranging co-operation, including in negotiations of 288 lawyers handling civil
cases throughout the nation. This successful co-operative model, which pre-dated MDLs and mass tort
class actions, was a precursor to the well-established work relationships of the mass tort bar today. See
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gradually expanded and became increasingly specialized as its members
became familiar with MDLs and navigated the challenges posed by the
increasing volume and intensity of liberal discovery. They remained trial
lawyers, but their appearances before a jury became rarer. Trial work has
increasingly been replaced by risk and reward analysis and settlement
negotiation skills. Most importantly, the small bar had discovered that the
field could be lucrative. 112 Entrepreneurial plaintiff lawyers successfully
displaced their entrepreneurial defense lawyer ancestors, the best of whom
were ironically drawn from similar social-economic backgrounds and mostly
shared similar Lincolnian views of their profession.113
Mass tort litigation in the 1980s and 1990s expanded exponentially.
Many thought it threatened the very stability of the court system amid
political tensions that reached a fever pitch in the mid-1990s.114
A now experienced and specialized mass tort bar was able to channel
and accentuate the propensity of individuals to seek legal redress for harm
caused by the selling of new products extensively marketed to improve wellbeing. Entrepreneurial “scientific” tort lawyers’ greater access and ability to
effectively use advances in epidemiological studies in mounting high profile

generally Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story––An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968); Schuck, supra note 66, at 945–46.
112
Arnold & Porter LLP earned $3 million in legal fees from the Buffalo Creek settlement. STERN,
THE BUFFALO CREEK, supra note 110, at 272. Stern, immediately after the Buffalo Creek settlement, took
two other cases arising out of two 1976 Scotia mine explosions in eastern Kentucky, near Buffalo Creek, on
behalf of a total of twenty widows. The two cases settled for approximately $6 million in total. Stern’s new
“boutique” firm, which he had just founded with two friends, earned $2 million in contingency fees on the
risky investment. As in Buffalo Creek, Stern won the legal battles that led to settlement thanks to a novel
and risky corporate veil-piercing theory. See GERALD M. STERN, THE SCOTIA WIDOWS: INSIDE THEIR
LAWSUIT AGAINST BIG DADDY COAL 133–35 (2008). The plaintiffs’ lawyers in the Ermenonville case
appear to have shared $20 million of the $62 million award, based on Stuart Speiser’s usual one-third
contingency fee arrangement. Speiser, writing in 1980 at the twilight of the “old” mass tort period, is not
reticent in defending high-percentage contingency fees. SPEISER, supra note 5, at 559. Given the shift in
investment necessary to prevail, Spesier concludes that “tort law has become more egalitarian, more
scientific, and more lawyer-oriented . . . also more money-oriented.” Id. at 592.
113
For example, the defendants in Triangle benefitted enormously from the brilliance of Max Steuers,
one of the greatest trial lawyers in American history. Likewise, their counterparts in the Iroquois Fire
defended by Lev Mayer, the highly successful trial lawyer who founded Chicago-based Mayer Brown, one
of the largest and most prestigious law firms in the world. Both of these defense lawyer-entrepreneurs were
innovative risk-takers in trial strategy and poor immigrants who implemented Lincoln’s advice in their law
practices. Like Lincoln and celebrated attorney Clarence Darrow, both Steuers and Mayer often acted as
defense entrepreneurial lawyers for the railroads. See TRIANGLE, supra note 5, at 222–58; and SPEISER,
supra note 5, at 128–144.
114
See Marcus, The Short Life, supra note 7, at 1587–92.
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actions coincided with a societal movement as expressed by juries to hold
formerly untouchable companies accountable. High profile cases such as
Dalkon Shield contraceptive devices, 115 prescription morning sickness drugs
(Bendectin), 116 Bjork-Shiley heart valves, 117 Agent Orange, 118 and the
asbestos and tobacco cases.119
The caseloads, influence, and power of entrepreneurial mass tort
lawyers increased with the greater use of MDLs and the controversial
Dalkon Shield and Agent Orange class action certifications in the early
1980s. The growth of the mass tort bar was also furthered by the adoption of
MDLs in the asbestos litigation of the early 1990s as a way out of the chaos
caused by the bankruptcy of the dangerous fire-resistant material
manufacturer, Jones-Manville.120
To meet the challenges and reap the benefits of the aggregation of
mass tort claims, the mass tort bar adapted by cooperating individually,
despite intense business competition between firms. Forced to work
together, entrepreneurial lawyers, acting in their own best interest, shared
more knowledge, resources, and finances to reduce the cost of fueling their
individual “investment engines.”121
The use of Rule 23 class actions in mass tort cases was effectively
ended by the Supreme Court’s Amchem decision in 1997.122 In Amchem, the
Supreme Court narrowly construed Rule 23 in affirming the Third Circuit’s
denial of certification of a proposed class who had been exposed to different
products containing asbestos, over different periods of time in a suit against
twenty former asbestos manufacturers. 123 In doing so, the Supreme Court

115

Hensler, supra note 73, at 983–86.
Id. at 978–81.
117
Id. at 989–92.
118
Id. at 1001–03.
119
See id. at 10033–06 (asbestos); see Cabraser & Issacharoff, infra note 276, at 871–74 (tobacco).
120
Hensler, supra note 73, at 1572–75; see Schuck, supra note 66, at 947–53; Fleming, supra note 6,
at 515–18. The author takes no position on the accuracy of these mass tort class action certifications as this
largely historical debate is beyond the scope of this Article. What is important from a comparative law
perspective is that American entrepreneurial lawyers increased their power by adapting to the opportunities
and challenges of the greater use of MDLs and the short but intensive use of Rule 23 class action
procedures in mass torts.
121
Schuck, supra note 66, at 952 (quoting Francis McGovern’s phrase).
122
See generally Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
123
Id.
116
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relied on the Advisory Committee to the 1966 Revision of Rule 23 opinion
that class actions were not appropriate for mass torts.124
Commentators, notably Richard Nagareda, have argued that since
Amchem the paradigm for mass torts practice has transitioned from tort
litigation to an administrative model. 125 Nagareda contends that mass tort
dispute resolution is driven by a process whereby entrepreneurial
peacemaking lawyers craft settlements that strike a balance between present
and future claimants, which raises governance, equity, and ethical issues.126
c.

Asbestos Cases: A Comparison

Asbestos case litigation caused chaos in the U.S. court system,
threatening its overall capacity to operate efficiently as court dockets became
overwhelmed and lacked an overall strategy to handle the crisis. 127 The
extreme tensions created by this episode are reflected in the academic
debates and narratives of practitioners it engendered. 128 The asbestos
litigation crisis of the 1980s and 1990s provides a vehicle for comparing
French and U.S. mass tort dispute resolution as a prelude to the
Mediator/Vioxx cases of the 21st century. Asbestos dispute resolution
treatment in both countries shares two essential characteristics. First, both
countries’ systems failed miserably in handling the situation. Neither
compensatory nor corrective justice was obtained as victims were denied
timely relief due to systematic delays and an actual or apparent avoidance of
accountability by corporate defendants. Second, a major factor contributing
to the shared failure was the “temporal dispersion”129 caused by the time gap
between exposure to asbestos and the actual manifestation and causal legal
recognition of harm to the individual victim.
The asbestos cases illustrate the following distinctive characteristics
of U.S. mass tort law and practice:

124

See Smith-Drelich, supra note 1, at 28–29.
See generally NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at viii, 105, 220–35.
126
Id.
127
Marcus, The Short Life, supra note 7, at 1580–92.
128
See generally id.; Deborah Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury
Litigation/ A Reply to Professor Brinkman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967 (1992); Schuck, supra note 66;
Smith-Drelich, supra note 1.
129
NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at xv.
125
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First, a single-minded focus on seeking relief through the legal system
either through the use of existing litigation procedures or devising
innovative alternatives fashioned by entrepreneurial lawyers or “activist”
(who might be more objectively termed “entrepreneurial”) judges. 130
Second, near unanimity that the State cannot or ought not play a major role
in the resolution (and prevention) of the problem, either as a source of
funding for compensation or in its regulatory role. 131 Third, limited and
ineffective use of criminal law to secure “social justice.” Fourth, high
preparatory legal costs and excessive or abusive legal fees.132
2.

Exceptional Features of U.S. Procedural Law

There are hazards in labelling American procedural law as
“exceptional,”133 nevertheless the following aspects are exceptional from the
French perspective.
a.

The Role of the Jury in Civil Cases

Civil juries do not exist elsewhere in the world, even in England.134
Despite the continuing decline in the already small percentage of cases
finally resolved by jury trials, their role in fashioning legal procedure, legal

130

Unlike French legal professionals, divided by a wide gulf between judges (magistrats) and
lawyers (avocats) who rarely have had shared career experiences, the American legal profession is unified
and dominated by lawyers. Further, almost all judges are former lawyers. On the “deplorable” relations
between French lawyers and judges, see Nicolas Bastuck & Marc Leplongeon, Maitre Darrois: “Il Faut
Supprimer l’Ecole de la Magistrature,” LE POINT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.lepoint.fr/justice/jeanmichel-darrois-il-faut-supprimer-l-ecole-de-la-magistrature-03-11-2019-2344945_2386.php.
131
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from
Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741 (2005).
132
See, e.g., How Lawyers, Not Plaintiffs, Wind up the Winners in Mass Tort Lawsuits, INS. JOURNAL
(July 11, 2019) https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/07/11/531801.htm [hereinafter
Lawyers Not Plaintiffs] (interviewing Elizabeth Burch on her book, MASS TORTS, BACKROOM BARGAINING
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, infra note 275).
133
See generally Mullenix, supra note 70 (contending that the gulf between civil law systems,
including the France’s, and American civil law procedures may not be as great as generally thought and
that globalization will further converge). Although the “exceptionalism” and “convergence” debate may be
largely a matter of semantics, the perception—if not the reality—as accurately pointed out in Lessons, of
exceptional procedural mechanisms (e.g., jury trials, punitive damages, and entrepreneurial lawyer fees)
has dampened the move towards convergence in France since the early, more global-oriented days of this
century. See also Zekoll, supra note 77, at 1334–35.
134
Juries were never used in civil proceedings in civil law nations and have been abolished in almost
all common law jurisdictions except the United States and for libel cases in England. MERRYMAN & PEREZPERDOMO, supra note 93, at 113.
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training, and the practice of entrepreneurial lawyers remains. Mass tort
lawyers continue to develop innovative jury trial practices in their search for
settlement, as evidenced by the use of bellwether trials, notably in the Vioxx
case.135 Lawyers’ risk analyses of how a jury would decide a mass tort case
is crucial in determining settlement strategy. Beyond this role in framing
compensatory justice, civil and criminal juries continue to be perceived as
vehicles for obtaining social justice in mass torts, both in their reflection of
the fundamental cultural and political ideals of egalitarianism and popular
autonomy.136
b.

High-Damages Recovery Amounts, Punitive Damages, and Corporate
Criminal Liability

As discussed in Section I.A.2(d), whether awarded by juries or
through negotiated settlements, the amounts recovered in U.S. mass tort
actions dwarf those in France. The banalization of billion-dollar settlements
following multi-million-dollar jury awards shocks French sensitivities.
Opponents of proposed changes to mass tort legal framework, often
corporate advocacy groups, label modifications as inspired by the
“American model,” and such characterization has been an effective tool to
thwart legislative change.
The specter of mass tort punitive damages is bandied about in such
labeling efforts, in spite of their limited actual recovery.137 French critics also
ignore academic criticism in the United States of punitive damages,138 and
their limitation by the Supreme Court on due process grounds.139 Punitive
damages in the U.S. system are designed to achieve objectives of corrective
and social justice, which are assigned to the criminal law in France.140

135

See generally Thomas Sekula, Selective Settlement and the Integrity of the Bellwether Process, 97
TEX. L. REV. 859 (2019).
136
Zekoll, supra note 77, at 1325.
137
See generally James A. Jr. Henderson, The Impropriety of Punitive Damages in Mass Torts, 52
GA. L. REV. 719 (2018).
138
Id.
139
See generally George Clemon Jr. Freeman & Makram B. Jaber, Further Progress in Defining
Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punishments, 61 BUS. LAW. 517
(2006).
140
Id. at 534–35 (criticizing the use of punitive damages in the United States as a substitute for the
criminal law); see Parker, supra note 13, at 411–15.
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Party-Centric Evidence Gathering

Pure adversarial tort litigation arguably was replaced by a settlement
driven model in U.S. mass tort dispute resolution, which has been qualified
by Richard Nagareda as “private administrative regime” evidence. 141
Nevertheless, American entrepreneurial lawyers in mass tort cases continue
to gather evidence through intensive and expensive discovery.142
U.S. procedure does not have an equivalent to the French civil party
mechanism that permits victims, acting through their representative
associations, to benefit at no cost from the instruction (evidence gathering
and evaluation) phase of criminal proceedings conducted by investigating
magistrates.143 Nor has the U.S. system abandoned party expert witnesses in
favor of the French neutral expertise procedure. However, the successful use
in the United States of masters and other innovative, entrepreneurial-lawyer
or judicially created mechanisms designed for a more neutral production of
evidence may present a future opportunity for carefully adapted legal
transplants.144

141

See NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at ix (noting that mass torts are resolved by settlement, not at trial,
by specialized, mass-tort lawyers’ use of the “private administrative regime”); Marcus, The Short Life,
supra note 7, at 1589.
142
See Grabill, infra note 253, at 170–71 (noting that most mass tort settlements, including Vioxx,
occurred after significant discovery and bellwhether jury trials). Grabill contends that discovery furthers
settlement by flushing out facts and legal issues useful in structuring complex settlement formulae and
matrices. See id.
143
See ABIOLA O. MAKINWA, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK 141–43 (2013); Einbinder, supra note 31, at 5–11 (describing the role of the investigative
magistrate (juge d’instruction) and the controversy over the institution’s maintenance). The continued
existence of the juge d’instruction in the wake of calls for its demise during the Sarkozy presidency, and its
abandonment by most other European civil law nations, vividly illustrates the twin risks in ignoring the
specificities of national legal systems in generalizations about legal traditions and assuming the
inevitability of “convergence.” It is inconceivable that the United States will adopt an institution so utterly
foreign as the juge d’instruction. However, calls for the integration of an action civile, modified to fit with
U.S. norms, to permit the joinder in criminal cases of mass tort victims’ claims may be possible and is
worthy of further comparative law study. Judge Weinstein, one of the foremost experts on U.S. civil and
criminal procedure, has advocated for just such a change. Mullenix, supra note 70, at n.70 (quoting Judge
Weinstein in U.S. v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 217–18 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)) (“The action civile does two
things: it initiates a claim for compensation, and it begins a public criminal action . . . . The United States is
in a state of transition on restitution. How far it will move toward an integrated criminal-civiladministrative system in areas such as mass torts . . . [is] just beginning to be addressed.”).
144
See Kessler, supra note 78, at 1194–98 (noting the use of masters in complex litigation and that
their use is consistent with long established Anglo-American equity practice). Professor Kessler contends
that a careful examination of French civil procedural mechanisms can serve as inspiration to alleviate the
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Federalism

Multiple independent specialized court systems do not exist in the
United States as they do in France. However, the complicated and dynamic
interplay between state and federal courts lies at the heart of the American
constitutional framework. Attempts to modify the respective powers of states
or the federal government within this framework risks creating serious legal
and political tension.
Mass tort claims are brought in both state and federal courts. The
maturing of the federal MDL process has considerably improved the
handling of mass tort cases. The success of this initiative at the federal level
has led to adoption of similar mechanisms by many states. Consistent with
federalism, each state is free to establish its own procedure, and significant
differences exist—notably in the procedures of New Jersey (home to most of
the large pharmaceutical companies) and California.145
The vitality of Federalism coupled with the creativity of
entrepreneurial lawyers’ intent to retain their influence is evidenced by the
failure of federal laws designed to “federalize” mass tort litigation by
facilitating removal of cases as federal MDLs.146
III.

THE MEDIATOR AND VIOXX SCANDALS AS COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

The scandals that erupted in France and the United States following
the discovery of the serious harm caused by two drugs—respectively
Mediator, manufactured by Servier Laboratories of France, and Vioxx,
produced by Merck & Co. in the United States—affords a relatively rare
opportunity to compare “test” cases of the dispute resolution mechanisms of
two national legal systems from different legal traditions. Differences
between the two drugs exist; control groups, even in scientific cases, are
seldom identical. Mediator was, supposedly, developed to treat diabetics147

weaknesses in US civil procedure attributable to botched attempts to import equity’s inquisitorial devices,
such as masters, into a common law adversarial framework. Id. at 1251–60.
145
Rheingold, supra note 7, at 623.
146
Id. at 624–25 (recounting the failures due to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ actions under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) and the useless Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdictional Act of 2002).
147
MIKKEL BORCH-JACOBSEN, LA VÉRITÉ SUR LES MÉDICAMENTS 218 (2014).
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and Vioxx for the treatment of arthritis and rheumatism. 148 The chemical
composition and real purpose of Mediator was very similar to the obesitytreatment drug, Fen-Phen, also the subject of major U.S. mass tort
litigation.149
The similarities between Mediator and Vioxx, however, greatly
outnumber any such differences and fully justify their choice as reciprocal
control cases. First, the drugs caused the same type of injuries—cardiac
arrests and strokes. 150 Second, the mortality and serious injuries were
roughly equivalent relative to the number of patients and their volume of
use.151 Third, both companies endeavored to expand the original approved

148

EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 38.
BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147, at 62–70 (describing the worldwide collaboration between
Servier and Wyeth in the development of a dexfenfluramine). Dexfenfluramine, an appetite suppressor used
in the treatment of obesity, similar to Fen-Phen, was marketed under the name “Redux.” Ominously for the
later Mediator scandal, Redux was found to cause heart valve damage and was voluntarily removed from
the U.S. market by Wyeth in 1997. For a comprehensive study of the Fen-Phen scandal, see generally
ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC
STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001).
See Scott Sayare, Drug Executive Faces Manslaughter Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/business/drug-executive-faces-manslaughter-charge.html (Servier,
which marketed the Fen-Phen family of drugs and Redux in North America respectively under the
European trademarks of Pondéral (fenfluramine) and Isoméride (dexfenfluramine), was sued in Canada and
paid $38 million to settle).
See EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 58–60 (in stark contrast to the United States, where
tens of thousands of Fen-Phen victims were indemnified following the filing of class-action mass tort suits,
Servier’s lawyers in France were able to obtain the dismissal of all but a handful of Isoméride lawsuits
despite the massive use of the drugs by millions and the publicity given to the cases by a well-known
journalist and the support of victim associations); see also Anne-Laure Barret, Servier Condammé pour
L’Isomeride,
LE
JOURNAL
DU
DIMANCHE
(January
23,
2011),
https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Justice/Isomeride-Un-plaignant-obtient-la-condamnation-du-laboratoireServier-258009-3240446 (relating the uphill battle of the very few successful litigants (10) who faced
Servier’s pugnacious legal defense despite earlier optimism following award of €417,000 by the Cour de
Cassation in 2006).
150
For Mediator, see EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 38 and BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note
147, at 218. For Vioxx, see David J. Graham et al., Risk of Acute Myorchardial Infarction and Sudden
Cardiac Death in Patients Treated with Cyclic-Oxygenase 2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal
Anti-Inflammatory Drugs: Nested Case-Control Study, 365 THE LANCET 475 (2005).
151
For Mediator, see generally Agnés Fournier and Mahmoud Zureik, Estimate of Deaths Due to
Valvular Insufficiency Attributable to the Use of Benflurex in France, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &
DRUG SAFETY 343 (2012); Paul Benkimoun & Mathilde Damgé, Combien de Morts Imputer au Mediator,
LE MONDE (July 5, 2016), https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/07/11/combien-de-mortsimputer-au-mediator_4967832_4355770.html; FRACHON, supra note 75; IGAS REPORT, supra note 65.
For Vioxx, see Graham et al., supra note 150 (noting estimation that Vioxx caused between 88,000 deaths
and 140,000 cases of serious heart disease with an approximate 50% mortality rate); Eric Topol, Failing the
Public Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1707 (2004). See also Alec Johnson,
149
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usage for their drugs to other treatments.152 Fourth, the intensive marketing
of both drugs was deceptive.153 Fifth, both companies falsified or withheld
important data from their respective regulatory authorities. 154 Sixth, both
drugs were lucrative blockbusters viewed as critical to maintain the
competitive position of their makers as corporate leaders in their respective
countries. 155 Seventh, both companies strongly denied allegations of
wrongdoing and mounted scorched earth legal defense strategies.156 Lastly,
both cases became highly mediatized national scandals, the subjects of
books and film, and transformed mass tort dispute resolution in their
countries. 157 The manner in which these transformations occurred greatly
differed as they were a product of the vastly different dispute resolution
methods.

Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief: The Policy Implications of Limiting Courts' Regulatory
Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1039, 1042, 1089 (2008).
152
For Mediator, see EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 38–43, 56–60; BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra
note at 218-219. See Laura Karas, Robin Feldman, So Yeon Kang, & Gerard Anderson, Pharmaceutical
Industry Funding to Patient-Advocacy Organizations: A Cross-National Comparison of Disclosure Codes
and Regulations, 42 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 466 (2017). For Vioxx, see Office of Public
Affairs, U.S Pharmaceutical Company Merck Sharp & Dohme Sentenced in Connection with Unlawful
Promotion of Vioxx, DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-pharmaceuticalcompany-merck-sharp-dohme-sentenced-connection-unlawful-promotion-vioxx [hereinafter DOJ Vioxx
Illegal Marketing] (Merck was sentenced to a criminal fine of almost $322 million for illegal off label
marketing of Vioxx. Merck had in November 2011 agreed to pay over $628 million in a settlement with the
U.S. government of civil actions for illegal marketing and false statements relating to Vioxx’s safety).
153
For Mediator, see EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 38–43, 56–60 and BORCH-JACOBSEN,
supra note 147, at 216–18. For Vioxx, see DOJ Vioxx Illegal Marketing, supra note 152. See also
NICHOLAS FREUNDENBERG, LETHAL BUT LEGAL: CORPORATIONS, CONSUMERS AND PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH 55 (2014); SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE MONEY CAN BUY: CORPORATE GREED ON TRIAL
121–22, 126–28 (2011); Johnson, supra note 151, at 1041, 1089.
154
For Mediator, see Pharma Funding, supra note 152, at 466. See generally IGAS Report, supra
note 65. For Vioxx, see DOJ Vioxx Illegal Marketing, supra note 152. See also PRAKASH, supra note 153,
at 166; Johnson, supra note 151, at 1041, 1089; Topol, supra note 151, at 1707–08.
155
For Mediator, see BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147, at 218. For Vioxx, PRAKASH, supra note
153, at 8; Topol, supra note 151, at 1708–09.
156
For Mediator, see BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147 at 69–70; Yacha Hajzler, Procès Mediator:
Les laboratoires Servier veulent gagner du temps, FRANCEINFO (Sept. 27, 2019, 10:16 AM),
https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/centre-val-de-loire/proces-mediator-laboratoires-servier-veulentgagner-du-temps-1728617.html. For Vioxx, see PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Merck’s general
counsel, Kenneth Frazier, saying “[w]e’ll fight every case.”). See Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx
Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass Tort
Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 514, 517 (2008).
157
For Mediator, see FAUCHON, MEDIATOR, supra note 75, (2010); LA FILLE DE BREST, supra note
75. For Vioxx, see PRAKASH, supra note 153.
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Mediator’s manufacturer, Servier laboratories, was founded by Dr.
Jacques Servier in 1954.158 The company developed rapidly and through the
efforts of its founder became the second largest pharmaceutical company in
France. 159 Servier was well-known in France for its capacity to avoid
attention. Artfully relying on the French cultural preference for discretion,
Jacques Servier built a company that elevated secrecy, loyalty, and hard
work as the preeminent obligations of its employees. The remarkable
financial success of his company enabled Servier to create strong but
discrete personal relationships with a succession of France’s leading
politicians, including a former Minister of Justice who later worked for
Servier and was indicted for illegal influence peddling in the Mediator
scandal.160 Relations with Nicholas Sarkozy, first as mayor of Neuilly, the
wealthy Parisian suburb where Servier’s headquarters were located, and then
as Minister of Finance and President France, were particularly close. Servier
was a treasured symbol of a French national champion in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry. 161
As in the United States and other countries, the French pharmaceutical
regulatory agencies were subject to either direct or subtle industry capture,

158

See Eric Faverau, Laboratoires Servier, Anatomie d’un Systéme, LIBÉRATION (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/09/20/laboratoires-servier-anatomie-d-un-systeme_1752695
(detailing the close relations with politicians, scientific experts nurtured by a dedicated department with
Servier); Valérie Lion, Mediator: Les Mystères du Dr. Servier, L’EXPRESS (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/sante/mediator-les-mysteres-du-dr-servier_949751.html
(describing Jacques Servier’s rise to power, discretion, and iron-handed control of a disciplined, extremely
loyal, and well-compensated Servier workforce).
159
SERVIER, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2018–19), available at https://servier.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Servier_AnnualReport_2019.pdf.
160
Henri Mallet worked for Servier from 1997 to 2008 earning €2.7 million. As with all the legal
proceedings related to Mediator, the criminal procedure has been slow moving. See Anne Jouan, Mediator:
Les Failles de I’Instruction Judiciare, LE FIGARO, https://www.lefigaro.fr/cinema/2016/11/22/0300220161122ARTFIG00243-mediator-les-failles-de-l-instruction-judiciaire.php [hereinafter Les Failles]. Irène
Frachon qualified the Servier company as a “cult,” a term also used in the instruction file of the criminal
case filed against Dr. Servier. See Pascaline Minet, Irène Frachon, Dénonciatrice du Médiator: La
Conscience des Conflits d’intérêts fait Défaut chez les Médecins, LE TEMPS (Sept. 28, 2018, 4:53 PM),
https://www.letemps.ch/sciences/irene-frachon-denonciatrice-mediator-conscience-conflits-dinteretsdefaut-chez-medecins.
161
Lion, supra note 158.
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and Servier was able to place its former employees and consultants who
were favorable to its interests in positions of influence in the regulatory
agencies.162
2.

Mediator Approval Process—Mediator’s Pharmacological Nature and
Undesirable Side Effects

Mediator (Benfluorex) was first placed on the market on September 1,
1976, after receiving authorization for its use in the treatment of diabetes
from the competent regulatory authority in July 1974.163 From the outset of
the authorization process, and even after its authorization was suspended in
late 2009, Servier contended that Mediator was not an amphetamine and had
an originality distinct from the two fenfluramine family drugs, Podéral and
Isoméride, the company’s most lucrative blockbuster drug.164
Servier’s purpose in insisting on Mediator’s supposed originality was
to avoid the drug being linked with either Aminorex, an appetite-suppressing
amphetamine marketed by McNeil laboratories, or Servier’s appetitesuppression fenfluramine family of drugs.165 Aminorex was withdrawn from
the U.S. market in 1968 after it caused an epidemic of 600 deaths by
pulmonary arterial hypertension in Europe.166 Mediator would be linked to
both pulmonary hypertension and heart valve damage.167

162

Id. Industry regulatory capture by Servier (and the pharmaceutical industry in general) was clearly
acknowledged by the Mission of Inquiry on Mediator and Pharmacovigilance established by the
Commission on Social Affairs of the French parliament. See also Anne Jouan, La Grande générosité de
Servier
Envers
un
Expert,
LE
FIGARO
(Dec.
19,
2011,
6:49
PM),
https://sante.lefigaro.fr/actualite/2011/12/19/16526-grande-generosite-servier-envers-expert; Emeline Cazi,
Le Lobbying Très Politique des Laboratoires Servier, LE MONDE (Sept. 26, 2011),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/09/26/le-lobbying-tres-politique-des-laboratoiresservier_1577727_3224.html; Aquilino Morelle & Marc-Olivier Padis, Médiator: histoire d’une seconde
défaite de la santé publique: A propos du rapport de l’Igas, 374 ESPRIT 71, 78 (2011) (noting that four
Servier-associated experts were present at the April 5, 2007 meeting of the commission in charge of
pharmaceutical marketing authorizations at which the decision whether Mediator should be withdrawn, and
only one excused himself from the debate). Dr. Aquilino Morelle was one of the three authors of the
seminal IGAS Report. IGAS REPORT, supra note 65 at 123.
163
BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147, at 217; Morelle & Padis, supra note 162, at 73.
164
See BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147, at 62–64; EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2 at 58.
165
BORCH-JACOBSEN, supra note 147, at 61–70, 217–18.
166
Id. at 61.
167
See id. at 61, 217–20.
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Mediator’s 1974 authorization was limited to the treatment of type 2
diabetes. 168 Nevertheless, the drug was heavily marketed to obese and
overweight patients as an appetite suppressant, which explains its use by five
million French citizens. 169 By 1995, French regulatory agencies were in
possession of clear evidence of the risk of serious pulmonary and cardiac
danger which could occur with long term use of the drug.170 On September
15, 1997, Servier, “by extreme precaution,” voluntarily withdrew its
blockbuster drugs Isomeride and Ponderal from the French market following
the outbreak of the Fen-Phen scandal and the withdrawal of Redux by Wyeth
from the U.S. market that same year. 171 Nevertheless, Mediator’s
authorization would not be suspended in France until November 30, 2009.172
The chief cause of the agency’s suspension of Mediator was the
eruption on the scene of a pulmonary physician practicing in the provincial
Brettony city of Brest, Dr. Irene Frachon, the whistleblowing “Fille de
Brest” (girl from Brest). Dr. Fauchon had noticed, and was later able to
convincingly establish, a striking correlation between patients taking
Mediator and unexplained heart-valve damage. 173 In June 2010, her book
Mediator, 150 mg, How many deaths? (Combien de morts?), that asserted
that Mediator had claimed approximately 1500 lives was published,
precipitating a mediatization of a health scandal with major political and
legal overtones.174

168

Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 218.
170
EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 65.
171
Id. at 60; IGAS REPORT, supra note 65, at 43 (the drugs were withdrawn par extreme precaution
(with extreme precaution)).
172
EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 57. IGAS REPORT, supra note 65, at 43; RAPPORT D’INFO
AFF. SOC., supra note 65, at 173.
173
EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 63–64.
174
Dr. Frachon had great difficulty finding a publisher for her book. She was rejected by Parisianbased national publishers who feared defamation or perceived a lack of public interest in her work. But
Charles Kermarec, the owner of Dialogues, a Brest bookstore, consented to take the risk. A preliminary
injunction requiring the deletion of the phrase “how many deaths?” demonstrates the risk undertaken. Id.;
IGAS REPORT, supra note 65, at 174. See generally LA FILLE DE BREST, supra note 75; Emeline Cazi, Irène
Frachon,
Vigie
de
la
Santé,
LE
MONDE
(July
10,
2015),
https://www.lemonde.fr/festival/article/2015/07/21/irene-frachon-vigie-de-lasante_4691933_4415198.html. French defamation law is far more favorable to plaintiffs than American
law, and suits are often brought as criminal cases. See Einbinder, supra note 31, at 37 n.109. In 2013, on
Servier’s instigation action, Dr. Georges Chiche, an initial whistleblower (lanceur d’alert), who in 1999
had drawn the pharmacological vigilance office’s attention to Mediator’s link with heart valve failure, was
169
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Mediatization and Politicization of the Mediator Scandal

The publication of Dr. Frachon’s book unleashed a media storm with
immediate political consequences. On August 24, 2010, France’s leading
newspaper, Le Monde, published an article entitled, Mediator: Combien de
morts?, by a socialist deputé (congressman) who would strongly support Dr.
Frachon’s efforts. 175 The Le Monde article generated considerable media
attention—breaking the taboo on questioning the number of fatalities—and
lead to the mobilization of victim associations and of Xavier Bertrand,
Minister of Labor, Employment, and Health in the government of President
Sarkozy.176
Xavier Bertrand’s rapid response to the scandal included counseling
all persons who had used Mediator to consult their doctors and ordering an
immediate investigation of the Mediator case.177 In 2011, the compensatory
fund framework proposed by Servier faced delays and deficiencies. In the
face of delays and deficiencies and in concert with victim associations,
Bertrand introduced and forcefully urged the passage of a law providing for
a government funded and administered indemnification scheme. 178 His
actions were universally applauded in France as signaling a departure from
the delay-and-deny stance taken by politicians in previous scandals.179
The 2011 law setting up the special fund for Mediator victims
improved in three specific ways from the existing general framework for

indicted for criminal defamation together with journalists from the well-known “Envoyé Spécial” (akin to
60 Minutes). The indictment was dismissed in 2015. See Irène Frachon, Irène Frachon: « Il faudrait
pouvoir punir ceux qui attaquent les lanceurs d’alerte », LE MONDE (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/04/25/irene-frachon-il-faudrait-pouvoir-punir-ceux-quiattaquent-les-lanceurs-d-alerte_4907965_3232.html.
175
See Tabet, La contre-attaque, supra note 91.
176
Id.
177
Marie-Christine Tabet, Bertrand: “Je suis Choqué par l’attitude des laboratoires Servier”, LE
JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE (Mar. 26, 2011), https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Sante/Le-ministre-de-la-SanteXavier-Bertrand-s-en-prend-vertement-a-Jacques-Servier-et-a-son-laboratoire-dans-l-affaire-du-Mediatorinterview-289727-3223403.
178
The special fund for Mediator victims was created pursuant to a law passed unanimously by the
French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) in July 2011. See generally Loi 2011-900 du 29 juillet 2011 de
finances rectificative pour 2011 [Law 2011-900 of July 29, 2011, amending finances for 2011], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 30, 2011.
179
See Estelle Saget, Irène Frachon: “Je suis devenue sans le vouloir, Mediatorologue”, L’EXPRESS
(May 14, 2012, 7 :00 AM), https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/sante/irene-frachon-je-suis-devenuesans-le-vouloir-mediatorologue_1113103.html; Tabet, Bertrand, supra note 177.
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indemnification established in 2002. 180 First, the alternative dispute
resolution mechanism was credited with significantly reducing the number
of lawsuits filed and earned the admiration of many other countries, and was
rendered more impartial through the introduction of a neutral College of
Experts. Second, Mediator victims whose injury had manifested prior to
September 5, 2001 (the cut-off date for actions under the 2002 law) would
be permitted to file indemnification claims. Third, indemnification was
broadened to include those temporarily incapacitated, thereby modifying the
2002 law’s requirement of a twenty-five percent incapacity rate.181
Payments to acknowledged Mediator victims are guaranteed by
government funding administered by the National Office for the
Indemnification of Medical Accidents (L’Office national d’indemnisation
des accidents médicamenteux) (“ONIAM”), which has subrogation rights
against Servier.182 This feature arguably made ONIAM overly cautious out
of fear of insufficient reimbursement, given Servier’s delay-and-deny
strategy that, when coupled with the difficulties of reviewing over 9,000
claims together with the College of Experts, led to substantial delay and
disappointment.183
The political orientation of the mediatized scandal and the
government’s rapid involvement and take-over of the critical issue of
compensation illustrates a fundamental distinguishing feature of French
mass tort dispute resolution in comparison to the prominence of legal
solutions in the United States. The difference is best illustrated by the
sobriquet given to Dr. Frachon as France’s “Erin Brockovich.”184

180
Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des maladies et à la qualité du système de santé et
le décret 2002-886 du 3 mai 2002 [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002 on the Rights of the Ill and the Quality
of the Health System and its Implementing Decree], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 5, 2002.
181
IGAS REPORT, supra note 65, at 97–98.
182
Claire Bright & Christopher Hodges, France: The ONIAM Scheme, in REDRESS SCHEMES FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES 433 (Sonia Macleod & Christopher Hodges eds., 2017); see also BIARD & AMARO,
supra note 17, at 16 (noting that the creation of the first French compensation schemes in 1951 initiated the
“socialization of risks (socialization du risqué) movement). The ONIAM scheme was created in 2002.
183
See EFFETS SÉCONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 68–70; see also BIARD & AMARO, supra note 17, at 26;
Marie-Christine Tabet, Mediator: Servier face aux victimes, LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE (May 13, 2012),
https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Justice/Mediator-Servier-face-aux-victimes-510528-3270404.
184
See Minet, supra note 160.
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A Tangled Continuing Legal Imbroglio

The Mediator scandal has engendered a complex web of litigation.
The existence of independent, specialized court systems, as well the absence
either of a mass tort litigation framework or specialized mass tort bar, 185
have resulted in unacceptable delays and considerable confusion. As a result,
the public has questioned the judicial system’s ability to achieve individual
and collective compensatory and social justice.
The following subsections provide an analysis of the principal legal
actions before the French courts to offer a comparative law window into
French and American mass tort dispute resolution.
a.

Criminal Law Is the Primary Focus of Legal Action, Media Attention,
and Political Debate

The first legal action in the Mediator saga was civil in nature and filed
a few days after the publication of Irene Frachon’s book in June 2010. It
was filed in the district court of Nanterre (Tribunal du Grande Instance
(“TGI”)), the jurisdiction where Servier’s headquarters is located. The
Nanterre TGI granted the request of a plaintiff who suffered from heart valve
damage to appoint an expert to determine causation.186
Contrary to the situation in the United States, where the response
would likely be civil, the primary focus of almost all the actors in the French
Mediator drama has been, and remains, criminal prosecution. The first
criminal action was introduced in November 2010, also in Nanterre, by the
filing of the seldom used direct complaint (citation directe) by the family of

185
A few lawyers have achieved prominence as specialists in pharmaceutical and other health-related
cases, having acquired experience in representing individual clients and associations in cases such as
Mediator. Their situation is somewhat similar to that of American entrepreneurial lawyers, such as Speiser
and Stern in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, they cannot be said to constitute anything like a present
day American-style mass tort bar, due to their inability to bring grouped cases, which remain a monopoly
of approved associations, and the strong resistance within the broader legal profession and public to any
such import. See Laure Mentzel, Maître Coubris, la bête noire des labos, LE MONDE (Feb. 1, 2013),
https://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2013/02/01/maitre-coubris-la-bete-noire-des-labos_1825362_16513
02.html.
186
See Anne Jouan, Le laboratoire Servier dans la tourmente judiciaire, LE FIGARO (June 4, 2010,
10:20
AM)
https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/06/04/01016-20100604ARTFIG00629-lelaboratoire-servier-dans-la-tourmente-judiciaire.php [hereinafter Jouan, tourmente judiciaire].
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a person alleged to have died from Mediator use.187 The choice of the direct
citation was motivated by the desire of the complainant’s lawyers to move
quickly and limit the scope of their complaint to infractions directly related
to the harm suffered by patients. Direct citation also permits individuals to
directly open a criminal case without the need to wait for the conclusions of
an instruction.
Soon afterwards, the Nanterre district prosecutor decided to transfer
the case for instruction to the specialized health unit of the Paris
prosecutorial office. 188 As a result, prosecutors brought two independent
criminal cases alleging different but overlapping criminal infractions. These
cases were against the same and different individual and corporate
defendants, and they were brought under two different criminal procedures
with very different evidentiary requirements by two different legal actors—
one private and the other public. In addition, the various parties within the
two procedures (e.g., individual patients, associations representing
consumers, social insurance funds) found their interests and legal strategies
diverging. 189
The complexity of this situation furnished ample opportunities for
Servier’s experienced team of criminal defense lawyers to use legal
challenges aimed at dismissing or delaying the actions. For example, the
case raised two questions of constitutional priority (Question de priorité
constitutionnelle) (“QPC”), a relatively recent innovation in French law that
requires judges to suspend proceedings if a constitutional question is
legitimately at issue.190 The district court judge accepted the legitimacy of

187

See Simone Piel & Pascale Robert-Diard, Le procès du Mediator renvoyé en 2014, LE MONDE
(May 31, 2013), https://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2013/05/31/le-proces-du-mediator-est-dans-limpasse-apres-deux-semaines-de-debats-a-nanterre_3421579_1651302.html.
188
Les Failles, supra note 160.
189
Simon Piel, L’imbroglio juridique du premier procès du Mediator, LE MONDE (May 21, 2013),
https://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2013/05/20/l-imbroglio-juridique-du-premier-proces-dumediator_3380832_1651302.html.
190
French political theory, echoing the French Revolution’s revulsion towards judicial power,
traditionally opposed constitutional judicial review, and its embrace and use by the U.S. Supreme Court
was decried as undemocratic. Opponents of constitutional judicial review, or for that matter any proposal
that could be characterized as an American legal import, effectively used the sobriquet “Gouvernement des
Juges” (a Government of Judges) as an argument against adoption. Limited constitutional review was
introduced in 1958 with the creation of the conseil constitutionnel (translated literally as “The
Constitutional Council,” notably not termed then nor now a “Court”). Very few cases were filed until a
reform in 1974 permitted groups of sixty parliamentarians, and thus the opposition, to seize the court.
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the two questions, which were related to issues caused by the existence of
the parallel proceedings. 191 The proceedings were therefore suspended,
resulting in a six-month delay, in order for the French Supreme Court to
decide that the constitutional priority questions did not warrant transmission
to the Conseil Constitutionnel.192
The Nanterre direct complaint action dragged on and eventually
fizzled out. The Paris instruction appeared to be over by April 2014 but was
re-opened the Paris appellate court invalidated a portion in November
2015.193 On May 24, 2017, the Paris prosecutorial office (parquet) requested
the Paris criminal court open the trial of Laboratories Servier and several
individual defendants. The Mediator criminal trial finally commenced on
September 23, 2019, almost nine years after the filing of the direct criminal
complaint in Nanterre.
Six months of hearings were planned in this massive trial, which was
originally scheduled to end in April 2020. The trial has since been suspended
due to COVID-19. It is conditionally scheduled to resume, subject to further
delays caused by the virus, in early June with a probable end date in
November 2020.

Through a law modifying the French Constitution—Article 61.1 of July 23, 2008—which entered into
effect on March 1, 2010, the power to seize the conseil constitutionnel was extended to individuals. See DE
GUILLENCHMIDt, supra note 97, at 418–20, 427. The response to this major departure from French political
theory and legal culture has been positive, judging from its use (844 cases as of March 6, 2020). For
commentary, see, e.g., Didier Maus, La question prioritaire de constituionnalité: dix ans après, enfin une
réforme
réussie,
OPINION
INTERNATIONALE,
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.opinioninternationale.com/2020/03/16/la-question-prioritaire-de-constitutionnalite-dix-ans-apres-enfin-unereforme-reussie_71847.html. The conseil constitutionnel’s procedure for judicial review is complicated
compared to those established in other European countries in that it requires the filtering of all requests
through the supreme courts for ordinary (Cour de Cassation) or administrative (Conseil d’Etat) matters, as
appropriate. See LAURENCE GAY, PIERRE BON & THIERRY DI MANNO, LA QPC VUE DU DROIT COMPARÉ. LE
CONTRÔLE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITÉ SUR RENVOI DU JUGE ORDINAIRE EN FRANCE, ESPAGNE ET ITALIE,
CNRS UNITÉ MIXTE DE RECHERCHES 7318 DROIT PUBLIC COMPARÉ – DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT
EUROPÉEN 2, 5–7 (2013).
191
See Emeline Cazi, Mediator: Servier comparaît pour “tromperie”, LE MONDE (May 14, 2012,
10 :52
AM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2012/05/14/mediator-servier-comparait-pourtromperie_1700669_1651302.html.
192
See Mediator: la Cour de Cassation rejette la QPC de Servier, LIBÉRATION (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:30
PM),
https://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/24/mediator-la-cour-de-cassation-rejette-la-qpc-deservier_841624.
193
See Les Failles, supra note 160, at 42–43.
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One hundred and ten hearings and over a hundred and twenty
witnesses were originally anticipated. Over two thousand five hundred
partie civile complainants represented by over three hundred and fifty
lawyers were joined to the prosecution. Charges of aggravated fraud
(tromperie aggravée), involuntary homicide and injuries, and influence
peddling (trafic d’influence) were brought against seven individuals (five
indictees, notably Dr. Jacques Servier—who died prior to trial), and eleven
corporate defendants (including the pharmaceutical regulatory office for
criminal negligence for failing to suspend the authorization to market
Mediator).194
The trial is being reported on heavily by the media, and courtroom
facilities large enough for five hundred members of the public have been
provided. Commentary by politicians, the press, and victims agree that this
trial may be France’s last chance to prove that justice can triumph in
complicated mass tort cases.195
b.

Civil Actions, While Much Delayed, Broke New Ground, but the
Amounts Recovered Remain Modest

An examination of the progress of Mediator civil actions through the
French legal system brings to light major differences with the treatment of
similar mass tort cases, notably Vioxx, in the United States.

194

See Chloé Pilorget-Rezzouk, Procès du Mediator: la Justice oblige de pousser les murs,
LIBERATION (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/09/20/proces-du-mediator-la-justiceobligee-de-pousser-les-murs_1752694; R. Bx., Coronavirus : le procès du scandale du Mediator renvoyé
en juin, LE PARISIEN (Mar. 16, 2020), http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/sante/coronavirus-le-proces-duscandale-du-mediator-renvoye-en-juin-16-03-2020-8281332.php; Ned Stafford, Obituary of Jacques
Servier, 348 BRIT. MED. J. 3298, 3298 (2014).
195
See Press Release, Victime du mediator: Enfin une date pour le procès au pénal des Laboratoires
SERVIER!, ASS’N DES VICTIMS DE MEDIATOR (AVIM) [MEDIATOR VICTIMS ASSOCIATION] (Feb. 5, 2019),
http://www.victimes-isomeride.asso.fr/mediator_date_proces_penal_laboratoires_servier.html; see also
Cazi, Mediator en procès, supra note 90; Henri Seckel, « Combien avez-vous été rémunéré par Servier ? »
: au procès du Mediator, le défilé des consultants du laboratoire, LE MONDE (Nov. 2, 2019, 6:07 AM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/11/02/combien-avez-vous-ete-remunere-par-servier-au-procesdu-mediator-le-defile-des-consultants-du-laboratoire_6017782_3224.html; Henri Seckel, « Ce médicament
n’a strictement aucun intérêt » : au procès du Mediator, la tornade Gilles Bardelay, LE MONDE (Oct. 29,
2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2019/10/29/ce-medicament-n-a-strictementaucun-interet-au-proces-du-mediator-la-tornade-gilles-bardelay_6017335_1653578.html; Pascale RobertDiard, Procès du Mediator : « Georges, il faut retirer ton signalement ! », LE MONDE (Oct. 16, 2019, 6:02
AM),
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/10/16/proces-du-mediator-georges-il-faut-retirer-tonsignalement_6015664_3224.html.
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First, unlike the confusing situation in the criminal cases discussed
above, forum selection in civil proceedings is a simple matter and the law is
clear. Plaintiffs will almost always be required to file suit in the district court
(TGI of Nanterre) where the defendant company (Servier) is headquartered.
French lawyers need not concern themselves with complicated questions of
federalism, or constitutional due process jurisdictional issues, like their
American counterparts.
Second, French and U.S. evidence gathering mechanisms differ in
fundamental ways. For example, parties may request the appointment of
neutral experts as did the plaintiffs in the first Mediator civil case filed in
Nanterre court,196 discussed in 4(a) above. Discovery in civil cases is very
limited.197 Consequently, plaintiff civil litigation costs are significantly lower
than those in the United States. 198 Nevertheless, French lawyers tend to
prefer criminal over civil proceedings in mass tort cases because of the
access the complainants are granted to the detailed and comprehensive
“instruction file” prepared by the investigating magistrate.199
Third, the absence of a legal framework for mass torts, 200 or
established informal structuring and co-operation practices developed by

196

Les Failles, supra note 160; Jouan, Tourmente judiciaire, supra note 186.
See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Symposium: Trends In Federal Civil Discovery: U.S. Discovery in
a Transnational and Digital Age and the Increasing Need for Comparative Analysis, 51 AKRON L. REV.
857, 864–66 (2017) (emphasizing that U.S. pretrial discovery offends deeply-held French notions of
privacy and is inconsistent with judge-led French evidence gathering).
198
See DAVIS, JUSTICE, supra note 87, at 150.
199
For example, a treasure trove of compromising internal documents—e.g., memoranda proving that
Servier intended from the outset to market Mediator as a weight-reduction appetite suppressant—were
discovered in a police search of Servier’s headquarters. See Marie-Christine Tabet, Mediator, les essais
secrets
sur
l’homme,
LE
JOURNAL
DU
DIMANCHE
(Mar.
31,
2012),
https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Justice/Mediator-les-essais-secrets-sur-l-homme-499045-3222587.
200
However, the Health Law of July 2016’s creation of a specific class action procedure in medical
cases may signal an important change. This procedure was for the first time to supplement earlier criminal
and civil suits filed against Sanofi, France’s largest pharmaceutical company, in relation to Déparkine, an
anti-epileptic drug given to pregnant women that is alleged to have caused malformations in newborns. See
François Béguin & Emeline Cazi, Dépakine: Sanofi visé par la première action de groupe en matière de
santé, LE MONDE (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2016/12/13/la-depakine-cible-dela-premiere-action-de-groupe-en-matiere-de-sante_5048007_1651302.html. Plaintiffs initially won a €3
million judgment against Sanofi. See Eric Favereau, Dépakine: Sanofi condamné pour la première fois,
LIBÉRATION (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/12/11/depakine-sanofi-condamne-pourla-premiere-fois_1615859. The plaintiffs, and future opportunities for recoveries, suffered a serious
setback, however, with the Cour de Cassation’s reversal of the award. See Dépakine: l’indemnisation d’une
famille
par
Sanofi
cassée
par
la
justice,
LE
MONDE
(Nov.
27,
2019),
197
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entrepreneurial lawyers for aggregated litigation, reinforces the fragmented
nature of civil law litigation. Progress of civil lawsuits against Mediator has
been slow. Over five years elapsed between the filing of the first civil suit in
June 2010 and the October 2015 decision of the trial court that held Servier
liable in tort for the injuries caused by Mediator.201 This decision was upheld
by the Versailles appellate court in April 2016 and by the Cour de Cassation
on September 20, 2017.202 In related proceedings, one chamber (first) of the
Cour de Cassation initially rejected203 an innovative mechanism in French
law requiring Servier to advance plaintiffs’ legal expenses. A different
chamber (second) of the Cour later rendered a decision upholding this
mechanism. 204 The confusion and delay caused by these contradictory
decisions, 205 which caused substantial delay for victims seeking judicial
resolution of their disputes, has contributed to the sentiment that the court

https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/11/27/depakine-l-indemnisation-d-une-famille-par-sanoficassee-par-la-justice_6020788_3224.html.
201
See Eric Favereau, Mediator: Servier condamné pour la première fois au civil, LIBÉRATION (Oct.
22,
2015),
https://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/10/22/affaire-mediator-servier-condamne-pour-lapremiere-fois-au-civil_1408103.
202
For coverage of the Versailles Court of Appeal, see Emeline Cazi, Mediator: la responsabilité
civile de Servier confirmée en appel, LE MONDE (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.lemonde.fr/policejustice/article/2016/04/15/mediator-la-responsabilite-de-servier-confirmee-enappel_4902789_1653578.html; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Sept.
20, 2017, Bull. Civ. I, No. 16-19643 (Fr.).
203
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jan. 29, 2015, Bull. civ. I,
No. 13-24691 (Fr.); see Squire Patton Boggs, Un « happy ending à la saga » de la provision ad litem, LA
REVUE (Apr. 17, 2015), https://larevue.squirepattonboggs.com/%E2%80%8Bun-happy-ending-a-la-sagade-la-provision-ad-litem_a2565.html (commenting favorably on this decision).
204
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Feb. 25, 2016, Bull. civ. II,
No. 49 (Fr.) (permitting the establishment of a provisional fund in cases where an expertise has clearly
established causation to the court); see Sophie Hocquet-Berg, La voie est (entr’)ouverte pour les provisions
ad litem en faveur des victimes du Mediator!, REVUE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2016/03/25/la-voie-est-entrouverte-pour-les-provisions-adlitem-en-faveur-des-victimes-du-mediator/ (attempting to reconcile the contradictions between the earlier
decision of the second civil chamber rejecting the concept of a fee advance and that of the first chamber
which accepted it by noting that in the latter case the judge-appointed expert had issued his report prior to
the request for the advance.
205
The conflict between the two chambers of the Cour in the Provisions ad litem decisions illustrates
a distinctive feature of French law. The Cour is divided into six specialized separate chambers: (1st)
contracts, (2nd) torts, (3rd) family, (4th) commercial, (5th) social, and (6th) criminal. A petition (pourvoi)
contesting appellate court decisions is assigned to one of the chambers. That chamber’s decision is then
remanded to a different appellate court than the one from which the pourvoi originated. On occasion, as in
Mediator, different chambers may render contradictory decisions. This aspect of French legal procedure
stems from the absence of a concept of definitive binding precedent in French law, a feature consistent with
the French Revolution’s strong distrust of judicial power. See BELL, BOYRON & WHITTAKER, supra note
59, at 29–30, 46–48.

JUNE 2020

MASS TORTS

625

system has been deficient in rendering compensatory and social justice in the
Mediator case.206
Nonetheless, the Mediator scandal has significantly contributed to the
development of French mass tort case law. First, the district court of
Nanterre recognized the possibility for longtime Mediator users who had not
yet suffered heart valve damage to sue for the mental distress caused by their
legitimate anxiety in line with the case law developed in the Alstom asbestos
cases.207 Second, the first chamber of the Cour, in its decision of November
22, 2017, rejected three Servier arguments aimed at reversing lower court
decisions holding it liable for the defects associated with the
commercialization of Mediator.208 The Cour held that the ongoing criminal
action did not suspend (and thereby delay) the civil proceedings—the
decision to suspend residing within the discretion of the lower court.209 It
also did not permit Servier to avoid liability by using the common defense
that the state of scientific knowledge at the time of the marketing of the
product was insufficient to permit it to discern the risk. Lastly, the court

206

See Anne-Laure Barret, Gérard Bapt: Le droit français est inadapté pour les victims des
medicaments, JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE (Mar. 10, 2013), https://www.lejdd.fr/Chroniques/Invite-duJDD/Gerard-Bapt-Le-droit-francais-est-inadapte-pour-les-victimes-des-medicaments-595616;
Iréne
Frachon, Video, Mediator: nous attendons ce proces depuis des annees, FIGARO LIVE (Sep. 23, 2019),
http://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/mediator-nous-attendons-ce-proces-depuis-des-annees-souligne-irenefrachon/6088720384001/ (Dr. Irene Frachon decried the intolerable unending delays in the legal
proceedings as a denial of justice for the victims and noted that although instruction ended in 2014 and trial
was slated for 2015, the actual trial was delayed six years due to Servier’s denials and legal maneuvering).
207
See Sophie Hocquet-Berg, Le préjudice d’anxiété des patients exposés au Médiator, REVUE
GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2016/04/13/le-prejudicedanxiete-des-patients-exposes-au-mediator/; Élodie Guilbaud, Nouvelles avancées dans le contentieux
Médiator, LE PETIT JURISTE (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/nouvelles-avancees-dans-lecontentieux-mediator/ (analyzing decisions of the Nanterre court in light of the Alstom asbestos cases and
concluding that the caselaw in favor of anxiety suits, while strengthened, is still far from clear). A recent
Cour decision has now strengthened the caselaw, favoring plaintiffs’ suits for anxiety in asbestos matters.
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ass. plén., Apr. 5, 2019, No. 18-17442 (Fr.),
available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/assemblee_pleniere_22/643_5_41955.html.
(including press release).
208
See Sophie Hocquet-Berg, Réparation intégrale du préjudice dans l’affaire du Mediator sans
réduction possible à raison des prédispositions de la victime, REVUE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2018/02/20/reparation-integrale-du-prejudice-dans-laffaire-dumediator-sans-reduction-possible-a-raison-des-predispositions-de-la-victime/ (analyzing Cour decisions
16-23804 and 16-24719 of November 22, 2017).
209
Id.
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struck down the appellate court’s reduction of damages that were due to
victims’ pathological predisposition towards heart valve injury.210
The amount of damages recovered in Mediator litigation has increased
but remains extremely modest compared to comparable mass tort cases in
the United States, such as Vioxx.211
c.

Administrative Law—The Existence of Parallel Independent Court
Systems is a Source of Confusion and Delay in Complex Mass Tort
Cases

France’s administrative court system presents several advantages over
U.S. administrative law practice. These include the French system’s longestablished tradition of independence, its role as a protector of civil liberties,
as well as the forum it offers citizens to contest government action by
invoking the general principle of legality. In addition, the clear
categorization and separate treatment of public and private legal questions
consistent with Roman tradition and French revolutionary political ideals
facilitates efficiency.
However, the Mediator experience demonstrates that these benefits
may not apply to all mass tort victims, whose claims for redress may be
delayed by the submission of similar issues to two sets of courts or
jeopardized by the risk of inconsistent decisions. Given the large role played
by the French state in the approval of and social security reimbursement for
medicines such as Mediator, the potential for victim compensation claims
and intra-governmental disputes after scandal erupts was great and, in fact,
occurred. Internal documents of the regulatory agencies, including opinions
of the legal counsel’s office of the Ministry of Health obtained during the
instruction of the criminal trial, indicate an early concern over possible

210

Id. (for both risk discernment and predisposition arguments).
For example, in the first civil case in which Servier was held liable (as discussed above), the sixtyeight-year-old plaintiff suffered a relatively minor case of heart valve damage, which nevertheless rendered
her fragile, but received only €9,750, reduced to €7,650 on appeal. See Anne Jouan, Mediator: Servier
condamné pour la première fois en appel, LE FIGARO, (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualitefrance/2016/04/14/01016-20160414ARTFIG00179-mediator-servier-condamne-pour-la-premiere-fois-enappel.php [hereinafter Jouan, Servier condamné]. Recent decisions are more generous. See Fred Tanneau,
Mediator: Servier devra indemniser une plaignante “à 100%”, L’EXPRESS (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/mediator-servier-devra-indemniser-une-plaignante-a100_2062400.html.
211
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individual and governmental criminal and administrative liability in the
scandal.212 Issues analyzed by the documents included whether, and in what
manner, liability might be imposed and how the state might be entirely, or
partially, exonerated given the extent of Servier’s culpability.213
Not surprisingly, both state agencies and Servier introduced
administrative lawsuits on these issues, which contributed to the long delays
and general confusion of Mediator dispute resolution. 214 For example, the
subjects of decisions within the administrative court system from July 2014
to November 2016 covered questions of whether Servier liability might
offset liability by the the French state (and vice-versa) and whether damages
for mental distress from anxiety were recoverable.215
The Conseil d’Etat decided these administrative law issues in a major
decision.216 The court ruled that the negligence of the regulatory agencies in
first approving and then extending Servier’s authorization to market
Mediator could render the French state liable—thus permitting victims to
bring suits for indemnification in the administrative courts. 217 Contrary to
the decision of the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour d’Appel
Administrative), the Conseil d’Etat potentially limited the claimants
recovery by holding that the nature of Servier’s wrongful actions fully, or
partially, exonerated the state from liability, before remanding the case to the
Paris appellate court.218

212

Aurelia Gervais, Responsabilité de l’Etat dans l’affaire du Mediator, LEGALNEWS (Nov. 14,
2016), http://legalnews.fr/index.php?option=com_content&id=327763.
213
See Anne Jouan, Quand le Mediator affolait l’État, LE FIGARO SANTÉ, (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://sante.lefigaro.fr/article/quand-le-mediator-affolait-l-etat/.
214
Gervais, supra note 212.
215
Tribunaux administratifs de Paris [TA] [Administrative Court of Paris], July 3, 2014, No.
1312466; Cour administrative d’appel de Paris [Paris court of administrative court of appeal], July 31,
2015, No. 14-PA04082; Conseil d’Etat [CE] [administrative court], Nov. 9, 2016, No. 393108.
216
See Press Release, Responsabilité de l'État dans l'affaire du Mediator [State Responsibility in the
Mediator
Case],
CONSEIL
D’ETAT
(Nov.
9,
2016),
https://www.conseiletat.fr/actualites/actualites/responsabilite-de-l-etat-dans-l-affaire-du-mediator. [hereinafter CONSEIL D’ETAT
Mediator Decision].
217
Id.; See Jean-Phillippe Orlandini, Pas de responsabilité exclusive de l’Etat dans l’affaire du
Médiator, JOURNAL DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.journal-du-droitadministratif.fr/?p=1137.
218
CONSEIL D’ETAT, Mediator Decision, supra note 216; Orlandini, supra note 217.
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The Conseil d’Etat also recognized that Mediator users who had
suffered mental distress from anxiety about their future health could sue the
state. 219 The Cour de Cassation also had previously recognized anxiety as a
ground for suit against companies, but with stricter requirements to establish
liability for anxiety.220 The inconsistent state liability decisions within the
administrative court system and differences between the parallel ordinary
and administrative court systems, with respect to the requirements for
recovering under an anxiety theory, illustrate structural flaws in mass tort
dispute resolution in France.
5.

Lessons Learned and Points for Further Reflection

a.

Present State of French Mass Tort Dispute Resolution

The Mediator scandal illustrates many essential characteristics of
French culture and distinctive features of its legal system that explain the
present state of mass tort dispute resolution in France. These must be taken
into account in analyzing opportunities for change. This case study has
demonstrated:
§ First, the critical role of the French State in
structuring society and serving as a vehicle for
assuring compensatory and social justice. French
citizens today continue to look to the state first for
relief in mass torts. Societal change, however, has
made them less willing (despite a satisfactory state

219

CONSEIL D’ETAT, Mediator Decision, supra note 216; Orlandini, supra note 217.
The Cour de cassation first recognized in 2010 the right of individuals to recover for anxiety in
asbestos cases. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., May 11, 2010, Bull. civ.
V, No. 24 (Fr.); see also Court de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Dec. 4, 2012,
Bull civ. V, No. 294 (Fr.). This recognition was later extended to cancer inducing drugs—diethylstilbestrol
(“DES”). Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., July 2, 2014, No. 206 (Fr.).
Lower courts applied the Cour de Cassation’s caselaw to Mediator cases starting in 2016. Tribunaux de
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, Jan. 28, 2016, No. 16 (Fr.). See La
préjudice d’anxiété reconnu en France pour la première fois dans l’affaire du Mediator, JONES DAY (Feb.
2016),
https://www.jonesday.com/fr/insights/2016/02/le-prjudice-danxit-reconnu-en-france-pour-lapremire-fois-dans-laffaire-du-mediator. See generally Marius Cardinal, Le préjudice d’anxiété né de
l’usage d’un produit de santé défectueux, UNIVERSITÉ DE RENNES, Oct. 28, 2016. For analyses of civil and
administrative case law, see, respectively, M. Bary, Vers la consécration du préjudice d’angoisse face au
risques hypotehtiques par la responsabilité civile?, REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L’OUEST, 2014, at 93, and
Christine Paillard-Cormier, La réparation du préjudice d’angoisse face aux risques hypothétiques par le
juge adminsitratif, REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L’OUEST 115 (2014).
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healthcare and compensatory funds safety net) to
accept the inevitability of harm to their persons
caused by the wrongful and possibly criminal acts
of national champions.
§ Second, French culture, including the basic ethos
of the legal profession, remains hostile to the
substitution of this pre-eminent role of the state,
and the resulting political pressure by private
action led by entrepreneurial lawyers. The use of
public interest associations as the entry point into
the court system reflects this preference.
§ Third, criminal trials are increasingly viewed as
the focal point for achieving compensatory as well
as social justice given the “discovery” benefits of
the partie civile mechanism.
§ Fourth, conflicts of jurisdiction and inconsistent
decisions between parallel court systems in mass
tort cases exacerbate the delays and complications
already commonly found in the court system.
b.

Suggested Reforms and Issues for Further Reflection and
Comparative Law Study

Consequently, the following suggestions derived from the Mediator
case study’s findings should be analyzed from a comparative law
perspective:
§ First, designing a mass tort dispute resolution
forum that could serve as a central focal point to
ensure coherence between the parallel French court
systems and reduce delay, confusion, and the
consequent loss of credibility of the justice system
for the citizenry. While the establishment of a
U.S.-style MDL forum would not be workable, a
legal structure responsible for the early channeling
of cases could be envisaged.
§ Second, evaluating the experience with the
specialized class action for health (including
harmful drugs) established by the 2016 Health
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Law (Loi Santé). This law extended and adapted
the general framework for group actions
established by the Hamon Law (limited to
consumer actions) to deal with the specificity of
compensating victims or their heirs who had
suffered physical injury or death from the
secondary effects of pharmaceuticals. The Health
Law’s innovations include potentially lengthening
the statute of limitations for opting into a class
from six months to five years, establishing optional
mediation procedures, and extending the benefits
of the law retroactively to victims whose
symptoms only manifested years after taking the
drugs. In addition, a far greater number of
associations (486) have been authorized by the
State to bring actions on behalf of pharmaceutical
victims than in the consumer field (fifteen).221 The
first, and only to date, experience of the Loi
Santé—the Sanofi Deparkine case—has been
mixed, with weaknesses found in the Mediator
scandal (notably delays in the courts and in
compensating victims). 222 Nevertheless, and
somewhat paradoxically, in view of France’s
strong historical hostility to class actions, the
eventual success of this specialized mass torts
class action à la française may be furthered by
elements of French practice that are lacking or
undeveloped in the United States. For example, the
risk of a Jones Manville bankruptcy crisis is
negligible given the French practice of providing
state-backed financing for compensatory funds. In

221

Loi Hamon, supra note 2.
See Eric Favereau, Dépakine: Sanofi condamné pour la première fois, LIBÉRATION (Dec. 11,
2017),
https://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/12/11/depakine-sanofi-condamne-pour-la-premierefois_1615859. The plaintiffs, and future opportunities for recoveries, suffered a serious setback, however,
with the Cour’s reversal of the award. See Dépakine: l’indemnisation d’une famille par Sanofi cassée par
la justice, LE MONDE (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/11/27/depakine-lindemnisation-d-une-famille-par-sanofi-cassee-par-la-justice_6020788_3224.html.
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addition, France is fertile soil for public interest
actions led by associations
§ Third, removing the prohibition on the filing of
lawyer-led collective actions and the allowance of
economic incentive fee arrangements, subject to
abuse curbing restrictions.
B.

The Vioxx Scandal

1.

Merck and Co.—Origins and Culture

Merck & Co. (“Merck”) has a long and celebrated history, beginning
in the German town of Darmstadt in 1688 when Friedrich Jacob Merck
purchased a pharmacy. Emmanuel Merck began manufacturing drugs in
1827. The Merck of today traces its root to 1891 when a U.S. office of the
original German Merck company was opened. The U.S. entity was
nationalized upon the United States’ entry into WWI in 1917. The German
and U.S. companies have remained entirely distinct. 223 Merck is based in
New Jersey and is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world
with over $40 billion in sales and employing 69,000 employees
worldwide.224
Until the mid 1990s, Merck had a stellar reputation in the
pharmaceutical industry for scientific research, safety, and profitability,
selecting its CEO from among its best researchers.225 In the 1990s it found
itself, as other industry leaders had, confronting price pressures from the
advent of managed care and generic drug competition. Merck attempted to
adapt to these changes by selecting Ray Gilmartin as their new CEO in
1995. Ray Gilmartin was a cost-cutting businessman and engineer who
emphasized marketing rather than research.226 By this time, the priority of

223

See FRAN HAWTHORNE, THE MERCK DRUGGERNAUT: THE INSIDE STORY OF A PHARAMCEUTICAL
GIANT 19–23 (2003).
224
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, MERCK & CO, INC., FORM 10-K (2019), available at
https://s21.q4cdn.com/488056881/files/doc_financials/2018/Q4/2018-Form-10-K-(withoutExhibits)_FINAL_022719.pdf.
225
See PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 133; HAWTHORNE, supra note 223, at 23–48.
226
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 134–38; HAWTHORNE, supra note 223, at 38. Hawthorne lauds the
Merck of old as “the biggest, most successful drug company in the world,” always a “little better than the
rest,” and “more scientifically pure” than the others. Id. at xii–xiii. Hawthorne believed Merck would retain
its “stellar reputation” in spite of growing financial difficulties between 1990 and 2001. Id. at xii–xiii. She
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U.S. pharmaceutical marketeers had become direct marketing of blockbuster
drugs by TV advertising. 227 It was within this context, coupled with the
increasingly fierce competition from competitors, that Merck launched
Vioxx in 1999.228
2.

Vioxx—Approval Process-Similarities with Mediator,
Pharmacological Nature, and Undesirable Side Effects

Vioxx was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
on May 20, 1999.229 Similar to Servier’s omissions to the French authorities,
Merck failed to disclose to the FDA the very real risk that Vioxx would
cause cardiovascular harm. 230 Merck research scientists, aware of this
undesirable side effect, took care to set up post approval clinical trials so that
cardiovascular incidents would be diminished in the Vioxx group, and the
risk of side effects would be placed in the best possible light. Merck
marketeers persuaded researchers to avoid conducting studies that might
harm their marketing efforts. As Servier had done, Merck attempted to
influence outside researchers.231
Vioxx is the tradename for Rofecoxib, an anti-inflammatory
prescription drug used in the treatment of acute pain, osteo-arthritic and
menstrual symptoms, and rheumatism. 232 Vioxx’s main selling point was

would not be alone in her praise of the “old” Merck and disappointment with the new. See Harlan
Krumholz, What Have We Learnt from Vioxx?, 334 BRIT. MED. J., 120, 122 (2007). This theme of a
dichotomy between the old and new Merck (“family-run,” “run by scientists,” versus Ray Gilmartin’s
“profit-first,” “business-first” company) was effectively used by the Vioxx plaintiffs’ trial attorney, Mark
Lanier, in his opening statement. See discussion infra Section III.C.3. See also Michael E. Tigar, The Vioxx
Litigation: Two Case Studies, TRIAL STORIES 406–07 (Michael E. Tigar & Angela J. Davis eds.,
Foundation Press 2008).
227
See Corey Schaecher, “Ask Your Doctor If This Product is Right For You”: Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., Direct-to- Consumer Advertising and the Future of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
in the Face of the Flood of Vioxx Claims, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 421, 428 (2007)[hereafter
Schaecher]. Rogaine, used to treat baldness, was the first drug to be advertised on television following the
repeal of prohibition on commercial free speech in the 1980s. There was no such parallel development in
France. In 1997, the FDA further relaxed its pharmaceutical advertising rules, setting off an explosion of
direct television marketing.
228
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 138–39.
229
See W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would It Have Ended Differently in the European Union?,
32 AM. SOC’Y OF L., MED. & ETHICS 365, 365 (2006).
230
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 70; DOJ Vioxx Illegal Marketing, supra note 152.
231
See Thomas, supra note 229, at 368-70.
232
Topol, supra note 151, at 1707–09.
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that, unlike Cox 1 pain inhibiting drugs—which significantly increased the
risk of gastro-intestinal ulcers and bleeding—it was a Cox 2 inhibitor, which
did not cause this side effect.233
However, Merck’s post-approval VIGOR study showed a significant
increase in the risk of heart attack and stroke from Vioxx use. 234 Merck
continued to aggressively market Vioxx, outspending all of its rivals and
increasing sales by 360%. 235 In April 2002, the FDA required Merck to
include cardiovascular warnings in Vioxx packaging.236 Vioxx proved to be a
massive blockbuster with sales topping $2.5 billion in 2003 and 105 million
prescriptions filled for 20 million patients between May 1999 and September
2004.237
3.

Vioxx’s Withdrawal and Ensuing Litigation

Merck’s second study, APPROVe, was designed to expand the scope
of the FDA’s marketing authorization to include polyp prevention. 238 It
confirmed the VIGOR study’s finding of a significant increase in
cardiovascular problems.239 Consequently, Merck voluntarily (as had Servier
with Ponderal and Isomeride) withdrew Vioxx from the market on
September 30, 2004.240
America’s mass tort bar, populated by entrepreneurial lawyers, did not
waste time in leading the rush to the courthouse. Hundreds of cases were
filed within weeks of the withdrawal. A total of 27,000 claims were filed by
the end of 2006, making Vioxx one of the most “popular” mass tort cases in
U.S. history.241
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PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 70.
Id. at 79.
235
Schaecher, supra note 227, at 453; see also Andrea M. Greene, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Liability for Direct Marketing and Over-Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Product Users, 26 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 661, 675 (2003) (noting that Vioxx was the most heavily advertised drug during the year
2000 and that Merck provided physicians with an enormous quantity of free samples).
236
Schaecher, supra note 227, at 452.
237
See Schaecher, supra note 227, at 453.
238
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 82.
239
Id. at 82–83.
240
Id. at 83; Schaecher, supra note 227, at 451–52.
241
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 24.
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Merck, like Servier, adopted a “fight to the finish” stance, forcefully
denying responsibility for Vioxx induced heart attacks and strokes. Merck
created a legal fund and reserves to cover its legal defense expenses totaling
approximately $1.5 billion in anticipation of this fight.242 Lawyers quickly
took up the challenge to fight and twenty jury trials were held in 2005, 2006,
and early 2007. Merck fared well in the majority of the trials: winning ten,
losing five, with the rest resulting in hung juries or mistrials.243
Nevertheless, the losses were felt deeply at Merck headquarters as
they foreshadowed an uncontrollable and uncertain future—a deadly mixture
for the management of a multinational company that lacked the luxury of
ignoring the other challenges inherent in an extremely competitive
environment. Several unfavorable large jury awards in 2001 created great
concern at Merck. These included a $51 million judgment in the federal
district court in New Orleans, $13.5 million in a New Jersey state court, and
two highly publicized Texas state court verdicts of $252 million and $32
million. 244
The latter Texas case, Ernst v. Merck & Co., Inc.,245 was the first case
tried and it set the tone for emotional media coverage of the Vioxx scandal
with the plaintiff eliciting much sympathy during an apparently harsh and
sarcastic cross-examination. The $229 million punitive damages award
showed that the jury wished to send a message of outrage, as urged by the
plaintiff’s lawyer Mark Lanier. Lanier was well steeped in the local tradition
of folksy Texas entrepreneurial lawyers who have been the bane of many
large corporations.246
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See id. at 24–25.
See Johnson, supra note 151, at 1042.
244
Id. at 1084. The award for punitive damages out of the total $252 million greatly exceeded the
Texas law cap and was later reduced on appeal. The entire judgment was later vacated by the appellate
court.
245
See Tigar, supra note 226, at 403–44 (providing a fascinating account of this trial, including
excerpts from witness testimony that demonstrate the critical role played by entrepreneurial trial lawyers).
246
Id.; see also Alex Berenson, $253 Million Awarded as Merck Loses First Vioxx Suit, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/20/business/worldbusiness/253-million-awarded-asmerck-loses-first-vioxx-suit.html; Chris Bowe, Merck Prepares for Long Fight Over Vioxx, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2005), https://www.ft.com/content/784725b2-1400-11da-af53-00000e2511c8; Alex Berenson,
Testimony
at
Vioxx
Trial Turns Emotional, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/business/testimo
ny-at-vioxx-trial-turns-emotional.html; Alex Berenson, Widow of Vioxx Patient is Pressed by Merck
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The enormous number of Vioxx cases dictated that most would be
aggregated. Consolidation into a single MDL in federal court was not
possible. The majority of cases had been filed in Merck’s home state of
New Jersey, consequently eliminating the possibility of removal to a federal
court under diversity of citizenship rules.247 Rule 23 class action certification
was also denied in the Vioxx cases, illustrating the narrowing and effective
elimination of mass tort class actions since Amchen.248
The New Jersey cases were aggregated before Superior Court Judge
Carol E. Higbee.249 The second largest number of cases were consolidated in
a federal MDL in New Orleans before Judge Eldon E. Fallon.250 The two
judges cooperated in an informal manner and exchanged views on how best
to handle trials on their dockets.251 To facilitate settlement, the two judges
proposed trying a small number of representative or “bellwether” trials,
which the parties accepted after much strategic reflection.252 This bellwether

Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/05/business/widow-of-vioxxpatient-is-pressed-by-merck-lawyers.html. The influence trial lawyers have on the outcome of jury verdicts
cannot be overstated. Merck’s lawyers in Ernst v. Merck were experienced, competent litigators from a
large, Texas-based firm with an excellent reputation and enormous resources at their disposal. However,
they proved to be no match for Mark Lanier, a charismatic Houston trial lawyer and part-time preacher who
was able to frame the trial narrative from the outset and persuade the jury that the “new” Merck was an
irresponsible corporate behemoth that had lost its moral compass and turned “into an ATM machine.”
Lanier, notably for this Article, artfully appealed to the jurors’ sense of duty, using his preacher background
to weave together their patriotic and religious “calling.” Only the jury, the last hope for American
democracy, can deliver compensatory and social justice. “Nobody has this power. A judge can’t do it.
Politicians can’t do it. Nobody else can do it.” Vioxx Litigation, supra note 198, at 404–07. By comparison,
in France, which has many eloquent but few “folksy” trial lawyers, no such appeals would be made, as
cases (including the ongoing massive Mediator case) are tried before judges and politicians are expected to
lead the battle for satisfactory compensation of mass tort victims. Lanier is broadly representative of the
American entrepreneurial lawyers discussed above and particularly of the small group of highly successful
mass-tort, Texas-based plaintiff lawyers, including the even more “folksy” Joe Jamail, who is best known
for his incredible success persuading a Texas jury to award over $10.5 billion in the Pennzoil contract
interference case. See generally Robert Lloyd, Pennzoil v. Texas, in TRIAL STORIES 204–82 (Michael E.
Tigar & Angela J. Davis eds., Foundation Press 2008).
247
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 28–29. The inability to consolidate all cases in a federal MDL
highlights the continued potency of American federalism. See also Johnson, supra note 151, at 1069–78
(provides a summary and critical analysis of the “federalism dilemma” in mass tort litigation).
248
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006) (denying certification).
249
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 28–29.
250
Id. at 29.
251
Id. at 29, 280.
252
Id. at 30–31.
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trial process, by providing information to the lawyers on the likely outcomes
of future cases, had considerable influence in driving the parties to settle.253
Judges Higbee and Fallon, joined by Judge Victoria Chaney
(California) and Judge Randy Wilson (Texas) had jurisdiction over 95% of
the Vioxx cases, and they cooperated to push the parties to settle.254 After
eleven months of negotiations, the parties agreed to settle for $4.85 billion,
which was publicly announced on November 9, 2007.255 The agreement was
subject to several innovative and controversial requirements imposed by
Merck. Plaintiff lawyers had to obtain the consent of eighty-five percent of
their clients to opt-in to the claim’s procedure.256 Lawyers enrolling any of
their clients in the settlement had to recommend settlement to all of their
clients or withdraw their legal representation. This “all or nothing”
requirement raised serious ethical issues and censure from at least one state
bar. 257 Plaintiff lawyers easily succeeded in meeting Merck’s threshold,
enlisting ninety-four percent of the eligible claimants in the program. 258
Over $4.35 billion was distributed to 32,886 claimants.259 Average payments
appear to have ranged between $100,000 and $200,000, less attorneys’ fees
ranging from thirty-three to forty percent.260
4.

The Dominant Role of Entrepreneurial Lawyers

The search for individual compensatory and social justice in Vioxx
took place exclusively within the confines of the U.S. legal system and was
dominated by the actions of entrepreneurial lawyers. The literature on Vioxx

253

Id. at 28–31, 280. For a critical analysis of the value of bellwether trials in inducing settlement
using Vioxx as a case study, see Sekula, supra note 135. The information gleaned from the bellwether trials
enabled Merck to negotiate detailed compensation grids useful in determining individual settlements. See
Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 143
(2012).
254
PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 28–31, 280.
255
Id. at 279–80.
256
Grabill, supra note 253, at 143.
257
Id. at 143–44; see also Smith-Drelich, supra note 1, at 46–54 (recommending solutions to ethical
issues raised by the Vioxx settlement).
258
Fred Charatan, 94% of Patients Suing Merck Over Rofecoxib Agree to Company’s Offer, 336
BRIT. MED. J. 575, 580–81 (2008).
259
See Becker et al., How Not to Manage a Common Benefit Fund: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in
Vioxx Litigation, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 7 (2016).
260
See McClellan, supra note 248, at 509.

JUNE 2020

MASS TORTS

637

tends to focus on questions of case aggregation methods, trial strategy,
lawyer ethics, and the proper role judges should play in settlement issues.261
Little, if any, effort was expended by victims, associations, “civil
society,” or legal professionals to pressure politicians, regulatory agencies,
or social insurance funds to assist in the resolution of disputes, the funding
of compensation, or the taking of corrective measures to prevent future
scandals.262
The Vioxx case demonstrates that the preeminent role assigned to
private actors within the U.S. legal system to resolve mass tort issues is a
distinctive and increasingly entrenched feature of American political and
legal culture. The reliance on courts, and in particular the jury, to solve
matters of importance to society that are generally treated by other
institutions in countries, such as France, is not a new development in
American history. However, the rise and dominance of entrepreneurial
lawyering in mass torts has considerably accentuated the tendency to use
private legal arrangements, to the exclusion of all other means, in the search
for justice.
The differences between French mass tort cases and Vioxx is striking.
First, the Vioxx victims were effectively “voiceless”263 and, except as a prop

261
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
1943 (2017); D. Theodore Rave, Closure Procedure in a MDL Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175
(2017); Sekula, supra note 135; Grabill, supra note 253; Smith-Drelich, supra note 1, at 32–50; McCellan,
supra note 248, at 525–37.
262
The reliance on lawyers and litigation mechanisms to fashion U.S. mass tort dispute resolution
leaves little room for proposals outside of this framework. U.S. practitioners and academics broadly fall
into two categories: private market litigation- and public interest-oriented. See Schuck, supra note 66, at
941–88. Proponents of both, however, share a focus on the role of lawyers, whether entrepreneurial or
public interest and legal process to the exclusion of other possibilities. For example, market: John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Action, Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371, 422–28 (2000); and public interest: Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating
Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 BOS. U. L. REV. 87, 146 (2011) (preferring private
attorneys’ general to agency action).
263
French journalistic and legal critical commentary on the Mediator saga, as previously in the
contaminated blood saga, see Feldman supra note 42, at 690–99, focused broadly on the failures of health
authorities to protect the victims and the inadequacies of French legal procedures which delayed their
obtaining compensatory, corrective and social justice. The “voice” of the whistleblower, Irene Franchon
may have been needed to uncover the scandal in the face of dissimulation, secrecy, and conflicts of
interests. However, once public opinion was mobilized, victims, while disheartened at times, were not
viewed to be “voiceless” in the American sense of the term. Victims had recourse to compensation funds
and civil, administrative, and criminal courts as individuals or by joining suits brought by non-lawyer led

638

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 3

in a few bellwether jury trials, did not play a direct role in settlement
negotiations or at trial. Second, unlike the mining community victims held
together by Gerard Stern in the Buffalo Creek disaster or by the Mont Blanc
Tunnel Victim association in that case, no sense of family solidarity is
apparent. Third, the determination of the level of legal fees and their
allotment among law firms was a central focus of the case.264
In contrast, a sense of internal solidarity and a real effort by
associations to provide victims with a voice in the proceedings appears to
exist in Mediator. The acceptance of the “all or nothing” condition used by
the Vioxx’s plaintiff lawyers epitomizes the replacement of the principal
attorney-client relationship by an entrepreneur/consumer model.265
The fees earned by plaintiffs in Vioxx have been estimated to total
almost $2 billion and included a common benefit fee of over $315 million,
the allocation of which was a subject of intense dispute and protracted
litigation between the participating law firms.266 Despite the high level of
fees (or perhaps due to them), most commentators, including economists,
contend that the settlement was favorable to Merck and shortchanged Vioxx
victims.267 The centrality of entrepreneurial lawyers in structuring U.S. mass

associations. French law under the “nul ne plaide par procureur” principle (see Magnier, supra note 18) at
119–20 guaranteed their individual voice. On the contrary, the issue of client “voice” has generated
considerable scholarly attention since the “all or nothing” Vioxx settlement procedure. which suggests a
real malaise with this issue. See Smith-Drelich, supra note 1 at 39–42; Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 283, 294, 301–03, 312–18 (2011) (“‘Settle or
you’re fired!’ is hardly abiding by the client’s decision”); Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 262, at
88–89, 97–99; see also, Coffee, supra note 262, at 376, 406–11 (for a pre-Vioxx perspective on the client
“voice” issue, suggesting that permitting late “exits” from the class would offer the best “voice” for
plaintiffs).
264
See Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics
Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 68
(2013); see also Becker et al., Attorneys’ Fees in Vioxx, supra note 259, at 25–41.
265
See McClellan, supra note 248, at 511 (“from zealous advocates to pragmatic entrepreneurs”).
This paradigm change has created ethical conflict of interest issues. See PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 281–
82.
266
See Becker et al., Attorneys’ Fees in Vioxx, supra note 259, at 7.
267
STEVEN GARBER, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION INVOLVING
THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS, 32–35, 42–45 (2013) (ebook); Kurt W. Rotthoff,
Product Liability Litigation: An Issue of Merck and Lawsuits Over Vioxx, 20 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 18, 19–
20 (2010) (concluding that the settlement by Merck of its Vioxx lawsuits for $4.85 billion validates
Merck’s decision, in purely financial terms, to wait until 2004, instead of withdrawing Vioxx in 2000); see
McClellan, supra note 145, at 510–11 (McClellan notes that Merck’s “try every case” strategy was
successful in securing a tremendous victory for Merck. He contends that the Vioxx settlement is therefore
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tort dispute resolution is exemplified by leading commentators’ attention to
the role of lawyers and their fee arrangements in proposals for reform. For
example, Richard Nagareda, in addressing the problem of “temporal
dispersal” 268 or how to compensate existing claimants, bind prospective
ones, and extinguish defendants’ tort liability,269 focused on developing new
contingency fee arrangements (leveraged proposals) 270 suited for this
purpose. Nagareda’s analytical framework recognizes the crucial role played
by entrepreneurial peacemaking lawyers in changing the paradigm for mass
tort dispute resolution from a litigation to an administrative model.271 For
example, in settlement agreements, U.S. lawyers create compensation grids,
similar to government administered programs, in what is essentially private
law reform. 272 This process raises fundamental governance and ethical
issues, which Nagareda, 273 Erichson/Zipursky, 274 Burch, 275 Issacharoff, 276
and other scholars277 have addressed.

inconsistent with the goals of corrective and social justice and sends the message that plaintiffs’ lawyers
cannot produce just compensation in cases where a large number of persons are harmed by a drug). See
also PRAKASH, supra note 153, at 282, 286 (citing victim plaintiffs expressing bitterness at outcome);
Johnson, supra note 151, at 1089.
268
Victim injuries in most mass torts do not occur or are not discovered at the same time. Information
on the harmful secondary efforts of drugs, for example, is obtained over time. Early discovered victims
initiate lawsuits which alert others who may have also suffered and then seek redress. Plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ lawyers will at some point seek settlement to compensate present and future claimants whose
injuries may not have yet manifested themselves. This time lag, or “temporary dispersal” is the source of
much uncertainty and conflict of interests among plaintiffs’ lawyers. See NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at xv,
24 (temporary dispersal requires considerable trade-offs between present and future claimants); Anthony J.
Sebok, What do we talk about when we talk about Mass Torts?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1213, 1216–19 (2008).
269
See David Marcus, Some Realism about Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1950 (2008)
[hereinafter Marcus, Some Realism].
270
Under Nagareda’s “leveraging proposal,” the contingency fees received by plaintiffs’ lawyers
under early claimant settlements would be placed in escrow to ensure that later, similarly situated claimants
would receive no less favorable settlements. See NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at 219–68; Marcus, Some
Realism, supra note 269, at 1951, 1967–73; Sebok, supra note 268, at 1213, 1220–25.
271
NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at viii, 101, 220–35. In likening settlement practice in mass tort
litigation to administration, Nagareda warns against the tendency to separate law reform through public
institutions and by private settlement in litigation. He urges a reconciliation of their methods and views the
involvement of public institutions in private mass tort settlements as perfuming the positive function of
both empowering and disciplining creative peacemaking lawyers. See Marcus, Some Realism, supra note
269, at 1968–73.
272
See NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at 57–70; Marcus, Some Realism, supra note 269, at 1951, 1957.
273
On governance issues, see generally RICHARD NAGAREDA, supra note 74.
274
On ethical issues, see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 263, at 279–92, 316–18; see also Howard
M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. REV. 979, 1025 (2010).
275
On governance and ethical issues, see Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 262, at 97–99, 125–
27; Lawyers Not Plaintiffs, supra note 132.
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Lawyers in the Vioxx cases (both plaintiffs’ and defendants’) were
innovative in their successful use of bellwether trials278 and the creation of
an opt-in model279 for settlement. In doing so, the Vioxx cases, consistent
with American legal culture and the role of enterprising lawyers, 280
introduced mechanisms such as compensation grids and judicial supervision
of settlement fund distribution and lawyer fee allocation. 281 These
mechanisms justify Vioxx’s status as a milestone in the structuring of mass
tort disputes. The development of these mechanisms in the private
contractual setting in Vioxx stands in stark contrast to French practice,
which primary relies on public social insurance to compensate victims and a
very modest role for lawyers.
5.

Criminal Proceedings, Public Civil Recoveries, and Shareholder Suits

On April 19, 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Patti Saris in Boston
sentenced Merck, pursuant to a criminal plea agreement with the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”), to pay almost $322 million in criminal fines.282 Merck
had earlier agreed to plead to a civil penalty of over $628 million to be
distributed to the federal government and participating states to indemnify
Medicaid for increased costs caused by Merck’s illegal promotion of
Vioxx.283 Merck pled guilty to allegations that it had made misstatements
concerning Vioxx’s safety and misbranding of off-label use in the treatment
of rheumatoid arthritis prior to FDA approval.284 The payment of almost a
billion dollars in fines in this joint federal–state action is representative of a
growing trend, first seen in the tobacco industry cases.285 which is consistent

276

On governance issues, see Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class
Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 859–60, 864–74 (2017); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in
Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3165–68, 3181–91 (2013).
277
On Governance and Ethical issues, see Smith-Drelich, supra note 1, at 32–55; Ratner, supra note
264, at 59, 73–86. See generally McClellan supra note 156, at 530–34.
278
See Rheingold, supra note 7 at 629–32.
279
See Grabill, supra note 253, at 153–59.
280
Id. at 146 (noting that the Vioxx agreement’s judicial oversight provision was “crafted
cooperatively by counsel” and not by the supervising judges). The constructive role played by Vioxx
judges in facilitation of the settlement and its oversight derives, in contrast to civil law practice, from their
previous experience as lawyers.
281
Id. at 161–82.
282
DOJ Merck Illegal Marketing, supra note 151.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
See NAGAREDA, supra note 74, at 188–90, 197–99.
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with the American tradition of public pursuit of corrective and social justice
through mass tort litigation.
In 2016, Merck also concluded a court approved class action
settlement of securities fraud claims arising out of the Vioxx case in which it
agreed to pay over $1 billion ($830 million to the claimants and $232
million in attorneys’ fees and expenses), illustrating the continued vitality in
the United States of private litigation mechanisms designed to rectify market
distortions.286
6.

Vioxx Claims in France

In 2000, Merck was authorized by French regulatory authorities to
market Vioxx in France. 287 A look at the fate suffered by French Vioxx
claimants is therefore useful in comparing the relative effectiveness of
French and U.S. pharmaceutical mass tort dispute resolution.
Vioxx was marketed in France for over four years, from April 2000
until the end of September 2004. 288 A group of several thousand French
Vioxx victims attempted to join the federal MDL handled by Judge Fallon in
New Orleans, with the help of The Association for the Assistance of Victims
of Medical Accidents (l’Association d’aide aux victims des accidents des
medicaments) (“Aaavam”).289 To the joy of Merck’s attorneys, however, the
action was dismissed in 2006 when the judge agreed that France was the
proper venue for the those actions.290
Four years later, in 2010, twenty-nine French Vioxx claimants filed a
civil action in the Paris TGI against Merck. 291 The court immediately
appointed two neutral experts to render an expertise. 292 The experts
concluded that neither Merck nor French regulatory authorities were liable
because no proof existed that Merck had falsified or withheld information in

286
287
288
289
290
291
292

See In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2016 WL 11575090, at *6 (D. N.J. June 28, 2016).
EFFETS SECONDAIRES, supra note 2, at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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its request for authorization.293 Based on this finding, these cases were also
dismissed.294
This dismissal, however, raised questions about the impartiality of one
of the experts, Professor Bernard Rouveix, due to his close links to (and well
compensated consultant work for) pharmaceutical companies, notably
Servier. 295 Consequently, the Paris prosecutorial office filed a request to
delist the professor as a court approved neutral expert.296 While this request
in the Vioxx case was rejected by the Paris court of Appeals in 2013,297
Professor Rouveix was indicted for corruption in the Mediator criminal
proceeding.298
The French Vioxx experience raises serious doubts about the
effectiveness of existing French dispute resolution mechanisms in securing
compensatory and social justice in the pharmaceutical mass tort area.
Consequently, the outcome of the ongoing Mediator criminal trial will be
crucial in evaluating whether the present system is capable of performing
this role.
7.

Lessons Learned from Vioxx and Suggestions for Further Reflection
and Comparative Law Study

a.

Vioxx Confirms the Distinctive Feature of U.S. Mass Tort Dispute
Resolution

Vioxx demonstrates the following distinctive features of mass tort
dispute resolution in the United States:
§

293

First, Americans do not instinctively look to the
State for relief in mass tort cases. Rather, the
rejection of the usefulness of regulatory and social
insurance responses to the issues of compensatory,

Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
295
Id. at 44–51.
296
Id. at 46.
297
Id.
298
Id. at 48–52; see also Chloé Hecketsweiler, Les pratiques du laboratoire pharmaceutique Merck
en accusation, LE MONDE (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2014/02/04/un-anciende-merck-denonce-les-pratiques-du-laboratoire_4359560_3234.html.
294
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corrective, and social justice has become more
pronounced. The promotion of private, marketdriven solutions based on ideology and economic
theory has increased since the effective
abandonment of class actions in mass torts since
the mid 1990s.

299

§

Second, entrepreneurial lawyers dominate the mass
tort dispute resolution process. The trend towards
an almost exclusive private, contractually based
approach to mass tort dispute resolution has been
largely driven by the mass tort bar (in cooperation
with defense counsel and judges), and any attempt
to reform the system to implement public
objectives will require the bar’s assent.299

§

Third, claim resolution by litigation, while subject
to criticism over the fairness of the amounts
received, was more efficient than it was in the
Mediator case. However, the weaknesses of the
French litigation system were mitigated by
victims’ easy access to a special compensation
fund and comprehensive universal healthcare.

§

Fourth, federalism remains a potent force in the
U.S. legal system. It both constrains the efficient
aggregation of mass torts and creates opportunities
for realizing societal justice through the joinder of
states in mass tort settlements and the initiation of
cases by state attorney generals,300 which may be
analogized to aspects of civil party joinder and
initiation opportunities in France.

See Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions-Past, Present, and Future, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
998, 1015–16 (2017) (asserting that aggregate mass tort settlements developed by entrepreneurial lawyers
and inventive judges can no longer be considered as being “in the shadow of the law” but the law itself).
The concept of risk and statistical proof derived from the science of epidemiology needs to be integrated
into tort doctrine through interaction with the bar if overdue tort reform in the mass tort field is to be
achieved.
300
See Johnson, supra note 151, at 1059–63, 1094 (discussing Federalism tensions and raising the
risk of independent state attorney general’s actions creating federalism tensions).
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Fifth, the Vioxx and Mediator case studies
demonstrate the dissimilarity of U.S. and French
mass dispute resolution mechanisms in the relative
importance given to civil and criminal
proceedings301 in the two countries.

Suggested reforms and issues for further reflection and comparative
law study include:
§

301

First, how to control lawyers and reduce the high
legal costs inherent in U.S. mass tort dispute
resolution? Lawyers play the leading role in
structuring the now dominant Vioxx-type, opt-in
settlement mechanism and their interests do not
necessary align with those of their clients or the
objectives of corrective and social justice. Better
client alignment and societal justice promotion will
require both the enforcement of stricter
professional ethical standards by state bars,302 and
greater judicial supervision.303 The extremely high
cost of mass tort litigation caused by U.S. style
discovery may be reduced by reinforcing the use of
masters and introducing the less expensive French
style evidentiary gathering mechanisms, such as
huissier constats modified to fit American legal
culture.304

Tort and criminal law are far more strongly linked in France than in the United States. The
boundary between the two is fluid. For example, a victim of a crime may seek compensation in either a
civil court or as a partie civile in a criminal proceeding. See Parker, supra note 13, at 415–17. The greater
emphasis placed on “cathartic,” social, and corrective justice of French criminal proceedings are aptly
demonstrated in the enormous attention devoted to the ongoing Mediator criminal trial. Interestingly from a
comparative law perspective, Nagareda strongly argued for using the criminal law to integrate moral and
social justice considerations into mass tort resolution. He favored a greater convergence of tort and criminal
law in cases of outrageous corporate conduct such as the tobacco industry in cigarette litigation, or one
would imagine, the Mediator case. See, Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization
of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1123–27, 1175–83, 1192–97 (1998).
302
See Smith-Drelich, supra note 1, at 46–56 (urging greater ethical supervision by state bars).
303
See Becker et. al., supra note 259, at 40-41; Sekula, supra note 135, at 890–94; Feinberg, supra
note 70, at 2180.
304
See also Kessler, supra note 78, at 1265–72.
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Second, how might changes in the ways
individuals are organized and represented in mass
tort dispute resolution better attain corrective and
social justice in the U.S. system? Present U.S.
mass tort dispute resolution does not adequately
respond to the need for individuals to feel that they
have had their “day in court,” and for society to
see that justice was served, guilty individuals and
corporations were punished, and deterrence was
promoted. The promotion of greater plaintiff
cooperation through plaintiffs litigating together,305
may be a useful avenue by which to realize these
goals.
These goals may be implemented by inspiring
lawyers to organize mass tort victims into closely
knit communities as accomplished by Gerard Stern
in the Buffalo Creek disaster and Robert Bilott in
the Dupont Teflon toxic chemical cases. 306 In
instances of outrageous corporate or individual
conduct, criminal prosecution ought to be
considered and the French civil party procedure307
adapted to provide a seat at the table for victims.

305

§

Third, the use of alternatives to litigation, such as
mediation and special compensation funds, 308
should be increased and healthcare and social
insurance schemes improved to reduce costs.309

§

Last, the deeply ingrained historical and
ideological opposition to regulatory action needs to
be seriously questioned to facilitate prevention

See Burch, supra note 262, at 145–55 (urging the adoption of a new model of co-operation among
mass tort sub-groups that integrates altruistic and community values by applying it to the Vioxx litigation).
306
See supra note 110 and accompanying text for Buffalo Creek and note 42 and accompanying text
for Dupont Teflon toxic tort.
307
See Nagareda, supra note 301 and accompanying text.
308
See Abraham, supra note 109, at 885–89 (balancing strengths and weaknesses of compensation
funds); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 73, at 1058 (questioning viability for lack of political feasibility and
probable opposition from lawyers).
309
See Abraham, supra 109, at 898–900.
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pharmaceuticals.310
IV.

in

the
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of

CONCLUSION

French and U.S. mass tort dispute resolution systems are products of
the distinctive features of each country’s political, social, and legal cultures.
French citizens instinctively look to the state for compensatory, corrective,
and social justice. To obtain justice, they first organize into associations to
exert political pressure on governments and turn to the legal process as a last
resort. Americans, on the other hand, are wary of perceived bureaucratic
inefficiencies and the delay and corruptness of the political process, 311 so
they first look to the litigation process to obtain redress.
Entrepreneurial lawyers play the pre-eminent role in mass tort dispute
resolution procedures in the United States. Any modification of the current
privately arranged, Vioxx-inspired opt-in model will require the express or
tacit consent of the specialized mass tort bar. In contrast, French mass tort
dispute resolution mechanisms reflect widespread cultural hostility,
including among the general legal profession, to the adoption of Americanstyle entrepreneurial litigation.
Both U.S. federalism and France’s parallel specialized court systems
pose challenges to the efficiency of mass tort litigation in both systems. Both
systems experience overload and unacceptable delay, which leads to the loss
of credibility—as demonstrated by failures in both systems to deal with the
asbestos crisis.
The Mediator and Vioxx cases confirm that the distinctive features of
each system persist and that convergence in the mass tort dispute area has
been limited. Opportunities to improve both systems through comparative
study of law and practice do, however, exist. 312

310

See Johnson, supra note 151, at 1040–41, 1095.
Schuck, supra note 66, at 978–79; see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 131.
312
See Kessler, supra note 78, at 1274 (urging that French and American mass tort dispute resolution
could benefit from reciprocal mutual correction whereby each system seeks solutions to its own excesses
through solutions found in the other system).
311
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For example, the extremely long delay in setting up the ongoing
Mediator criminal trial is not a fatality inherent in French legal procedure.
The establishment of a forum tasked with channeling cases filed in different
specialized courts inspired by the success of MDL in the United States ought
to be examined to remedy this deficiency. Likewise, a comparison of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the French court-appointed expertise
and U.S. expert witnesses would be useful in improving a critical element of
pharmaceutical mass tort disputes.313
The United States’ complicated allocation of attorneys’ fees is not an
inalterable essential tenet of its legal system any more than the French’s
refusal to permit lawyers to adopt fee arrangements that would incentivize
their greater participation in mass tort litigation.
Most importantly, and often lost in debates that center on litigation, is
the fundamental issue of why neither system was able to prevent the mismarketing of dangerous drugs in the first place. Comparative study may
provide guidance on a way to reform these regulatory failures.
Comparative analysis must closely consider actual practice in the
shadow of the law, as well as the cultural values underlying each country’s
system.314 When these are taken into account comparative study can play an
important role in law reform designed to obtain justice in mass tort dispute
resolution.

313
See Mullenix, supra note 70, at 31 (urging American legal professionals to study civil procedural
mechanisms used in complex litigation in civil law countries, such as France).
314
See Mauro Bussani & Marta Infantino, Tort Law and Legal Cultures, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 77–
80 (2015); Gilles Cuniberti, Enhancing Judicial Reputation Through Legal Transplants – Estoppel Travels
to France, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 384, (2012); Silvia Ferreri & Larry A. DiMatteo, Terminology Matters:
Dangers of Superficial Transplantation, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 35, 36–37, 41–46, 49–57, 85–87 (2019); see
also Deborah R. Hensler, Introduction: The Global Landscape of Collective Litigation, in CLASS ACTIONS
IN CONTEXT 3–18, 387–409 (Deborah R. Hensler, Christopher Hodges, & Ianika Tzankova eds., 2016).

648

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 3

